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In the five years since the Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services,1 a clear consensus has
yet to emerge on the criteria for defining the circumstances that give rise
to a constitutional duty of the state to provide protection to persons from
acts of private violence. The DeShaney Court expressly rejected the
argument
that once the State learns that a third party poses a special dan-
ger to an identified victim, and indicates its willingness to pro-
tect the victim against that danger, a "special relationship"
arises between State and victim, giving rise to an affirmative
duty, enforceable through the Due Process Clause, to render
adequate protection.2
Although DeShaney may be narrowly read to limit any affirmative
duty to protect to situations in which "the State takes a person into its
custody and holds him there against his will,"3 a number of lower federal
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School; B.A., 1968, Wells College; J.D.,
1974, Suffolk University Law School; LL.M., 1976, Harvard University Law School. The Au-
thor wishes to express her gratitude to Dean Paul Sugarman and Suffolk University Law
School for their financial and moral support. Many thanks as well to our fine research librari-
ans, who always make my task easier.
1. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). Although most readers are probably familiar with the tragic facts
of DeShaney, they bear repeating here. Four-year-old Joshua had been repeatedly beaten by
his father. Id. at 192. The county child protection agency, which had been monitoring his
case through social workers, failed to protect Joshua from his father's last beating, which left
Joshua in a permanently brain-damaged state. Id at 193. A majority of the Supreme Court
held that nothing in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment creates an affirma-
tive duty on the part of the state to "protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against
invasion by private actors." Id at 195. The Court concluded that "[a]s a general matter,.., a
State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a
violation of the Due Process Clause." Id at 197.
2. Id at 198 n.4.
3. Id at 199-200; accord Was v. Young, 796 F. Supp. 1041, 1050 (E.D. Mich. 1992)
(concluding that "[albsent some kind of custodial relationship between the state and either
Plaintiffs or their attackers, no constitutional duty can be imposed on Defendants"); see, e.g.,
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (finding substantive due process component of
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause imposes duty on state to provide for safety and
medical needs of involuntarily committed mental patients); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103
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courts confronting the question have interpreted DeShaney to recognize
a duty to protect outside the contexts of imprisonment and involuntary
confinement in public institutions.
Plaintiffs who have successfully survived the DeShaney analysis
have generally asserted substantive due process claims4 based on a breach
of the duty to protect in one of two contexts: (1) The plaintiff was in the
state's "functional custody" when harmed; or (2) the plaintiff was in a
"snake-pit" ' situation where the state created or increased the danger to
(1976) (recognizing state has constitutional duty to provide adequate medical care to incarcer-
ated prisoners); see also Nobles v. Brown, 985 F.2d 235, 239 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that "[t]he
people of Michigan are free to create a system under which the state and its officials would be
subjected to liability for failure to accord prison guards reasonable protection against harms
inflicted by dangerous prisoners. This court, however, is not free to create such a system by
turning the Due Process Clause into a Michigan Tort Claims Act"); Lipscomb v. Simmons,
962 F.2d 1374, 1379 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (observing that "custody cases such as
DeShaney and Youngberg stand for the proposition that the government has an affirmative
obligation to facilitate the exercise of constitutional rights by those in its custody only when
the circumstances of the custodial relationship directly prevent individual exercise of those
rights"); Salazar v. City of Chicago, 940 F.2d 233, 237 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that govern-
ment has no constitutional duty to provide competent rescue services to people not in its cus-
tody); Harris v. District of Columbia, 932 F.2d 10, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (indicating that
plaintiff who died of drug overdose while in police custody was owed no constitutional duty by
police to obtain medical assistance where plaintiff "had not been formally committed, either
by conviction, involuntary commitment, or arrest, to the charge of the District"); Hilliard v.
City of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516, 1520 (10th Cir.) (indicating reluctance to find constitutional
right to personal security in absence of state-imposed confinement or custody), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 656 (1991); Piechowicz v. United States, 885 F.2d 1207, 1215 (4th Cir. 1989) (con-
cluding that federal witnesses murdered by hired killer were owed no duty of protection under
Fifth Amendment substantive Due Process Clause where witnesses were not "in custody" of
United States); de Jesus Benavides v. Santos, 883 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding affirm-
ative duty to protect prisoner arises from state's restraint on individual's liberty and that state
has no affirmative constitutional duty to protect prison guards from inmates' violence).
4. The Court has recognized three types of claims that may be asserted under the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause. First, the Bill of Rights sets forth specific rights that
are incorporated and made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). Second, rights exist to substan-
tive due process and to be free from government action that is arbitrary, irrational, and wrong-
ful, regardless of the procedure accompanying the conduct. Id. Third, a right to procedural
fairness exists when the state acts to deprive a person of a constitutionally protected interest.
Id These actions are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
5. In Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982), Judge Posner wrote that "[i]f the
state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him ...
it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit," id. at 618.
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which the plaintiff was exposed. 6 Alternatively, plaintiffs unable to cast
their cases in the relatively narrow substantive due process mold carved
out by DeShaney have still succeeded by framing the case as a procedural
due process7 or an equal protection claim.'
6. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in DeShaney, suggested that the case
might have been decided differently if the state had helped create the dangers that Joshua faced
or had rendered Joshua more vulnerable to these dangeis. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
7. The Court in DeShaney did not address the petitioners' argument, raised for the first
time in the Supreme Court, that an "entitlement" to protective services existed under state law,
any deprivation of which was subject to Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process con-
straints. Id at 195 n.2.
Some lower federal courts have recognized procedural due process claims based on the
pleading of such entitlements. See, eg., Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d
474, 476-77 (6th Cir.) (determining that Kentucky state law provided children placed in state-
regulated foster homes with "framework of entitlements," including "an entitlement to protec-
tive services of which they may not be deprived without due process of law"), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 867 (1990); Coffinan v. Wilson Police, 739 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (concluding that
in domestic abuse case protective orders, issued by state court pursuant to authority under
state law, created constitutionally protected property interest in police protection); see also
Siddle v. City of Cambridge, 761 F. Supp. 503, 509 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (finding protective order
issued under state law created property right that created duty on part of government and
failure to perform duty could constitute procedural due process violation); cf Losinski v.
County of Trempealeau, 946 F.2d 544, 551 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding no property right was
created by state law "no contact" temporary restraining order or state law abuse policies).
In Dawson v. Milwaukee Housing Authority, 930 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1991), the plaintiff
argued that Wisconsin state law created an entitlement to safe public housing "that the state
could not take away without notice and an opportunity for a hearing," id. at 1286. Judge
Easterbrook rejected the argument, stating that
[t]he Housing Authority's decision to set a particular target level of safety is not
person-specific. It is a legislative rather than adjudicative decision, and the due pro-
cess clause does not require individual hearings before a governmental body takes
decisions that affect the interests of persons in the aggregate.
Id.
It is important to note in this entitlement/procedural due process context that procedural
guidelines in and of themselves will not create a liberty or property interest. See, eg., Villa-
nova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 798 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting "persistent fallacy that procedural
requirements create substantive entitlements"); Kellas v. Lane, 923 F.2d 492, 495 (7th Cir.
1991) (holding "a state creates a protected liberty interest only when it establishes 'specific
substantive predicates' that limit the discretion of official decisionmakers and mandates a par-
ticular outcome to be reached if the relevant criteria have been met" (quoting Kentucky Dep't
of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1989)); see also Bagley v. Rogerson, Nos.
92-3245NI, 92-3343NI, 1993 WL 358543, at *3 (8th Cir. Sept. 20, 1993) ("If a state law gives
me the right to a certain outcome in the event of the occurrence of certain facts, I have a right,
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, to whatever process is due in connection with the
determination of whether those facts exist. This is not at all the same thing as saying that the
federal Constitution guarantees me all rights created or conferred upon me by state law.");
Coker v. Henry, 813 F. Supp. 567, 570 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (finding Michigan Child Protection
Law "not sufficiently explicit and mandatory" so as to create legitimate claim of entitlement);
Boston v. Lafayette County, 743 F. Supp. 462, 472 (N.D. Miss. 1990) (concluding state stat-
ute, creating duty on part of sheriff to safely keep prisoners entrusted to his care, could not
serve as source of constitutionally cognizable procedural due process claim).
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The purpose of this Article is to examine post-DeShaney cases that
have addressed the fmctional custody and snake-pit approaches to sub-
stantive due process claims. In a custody context the examination ex-
poses problems created by any requirement that involuntariness serve as
a threshold that must be satisfied before the state has an affirmative con-
stitutional duty to protect citizens from harm caused by private actors. 9
Although the nature of the custody may be relevant in determining the
level of culpability that will be required to establish a due process claim
for failure to protect, this Article takes the position that the criterion of
8. The Court noted inDeShaney that any selective denial of protected services to "certain
disfavored minorities" would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.3. Many of the cases attempting to circumvent
DeShaney's restrictions on substantive due process claims, based on the breach of an affirma-
tive duty to protect, involve domestic abuse situations. In these cases the plaintiffs typically
allege that a policy of selective and impermissible discriminatory police protection led to a
failure to protect. See, eg., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 701-02 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding that where allegations in plaintiff's complaint suggested "an intention to treat
domestic abuse cases less seriously than other assaults, as well as an animus against abused
women," district court should not have dismissed complaint with prejudice, but should have
allowed plaintiff opportunity to amend in order to properly plead equal protection claim);
Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026, 1031 (3d Cir. 1988) (determining that to survive
motion for summary judgment, "a plaintiff must proffer sufficient evidence that would allow a
reasonable jury to infer that it is the policy or custom of the police to provide less protection to
victims of domestic violence than to other victims of violence, that discrimination against wo-
men was a motivating factor, and that the plaintiff was injured by the policy or custom");
Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiff's
evidence was sufficient to support jury determination "that the City and Police Department
followed a policy or custom of affording less protection to victims of domestic violence than to
victims of nondomestic attacks [and] ... that the City and Police Department acted with a
discriminatory motive in pursuing this policy"); Pinder v. Commissioners of Cambridge, 821
F. Supp. 376, 386 (D. Md. 1993) (finding allegations of plaintiff's complaint "sufficient to
make out a claim that Defendants maintain a policy that discriminated against victims of
domestic violence"); see also Mody v. City of Hoboken, 959 F.2d 461, 467 (3d Cir. 1992)
(rejecting plaintiff's claim when "evidence necessary to show constitutionally discriminatory
police action in failing to provide cognizable minorities with protection from crime [was] ab-
sent"); Baugh v. City of Milwaukee, 823 F. Supp. 1452, 1460-67 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (rejecting
plaintiffs' argument that city had policy of denying equal housing inspection and code enforce-
ment services based on race); Sinthasomphone v. City of Milwaukee, 785 F. Supp. 1343, 1350
(E.D. Wis. 1992) (finding complaint "clearly states a claim that the actions of the officers and
the policy of the City both are due to intentional discrimination on the 'basis of race, color,
national origin, or sexual orientation' "); cf McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 416
(5th Cir. 1989) (finding complete failure of proof on issue of differential treatment of victims of
domestic abuse and leaving undecided question of whether such differential treatment would
constitute intentional, gender-based discrimination), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1990);
Howell v. City of Catoosa, 729 F. Supp. 1308, 1311-12 (N.D. Okla. 1990) (determining plain-
tiffs failed to show city had "governmental policy of indifference to victims of domestic vio-
lence or of discrimination against women because of their gender").
9. See infra part II.
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involuntariness should not serve as a talisman for either the duty owed or
the standard of culpability applied.1"
Separately, the noncustodial snake-pit cases reveal the difficulties in-
herent in any theory of affirmative duty based on a distinction between
action and inaction.11 It is suggested in this context that a duty to pro-
tect should be recognized when the state, by affirmative acts or sins of
omission, creates or enhances the risk of harm confronting an individ-
ual. 2 In the snake-pit context less emphasis should be placed on the
affirmative nature of the state's acts, while rigorous scrutiny should be
given to the factors of causation and culpability.13 The latter factors bet-
ter determine the ultimate finding of a breach of duty and the imposition
of constitutional liability.
II. THE FUNCTIONAL CUSTODY CASES
A. Foster Care Context
Some plaintiffs have attempted to satisfy even the most uncompro-
mising interpretation of DeShaney: that an affirmative duty to protect
exists only in an involuntary custodial situation. These plaintiffs have
urged the courts to expand the notion of what constitutes "custodial"
beyond the strict confines of a prison or state-operated institution for the
mentally il.14
The most widely accepted scenario for extending the duty to protect
beyond the prison or state hospital setting arises in the context of foster
care. In DeShaney, the Court acknowledged that the situation in which
the state removes a child from "free society" and places him or her in a
foster home might be "sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institu-
tionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect."1 " Indeed, the
10. See infra part II.
11. Justice Brennan, dissenting in DeShaney, noted that "[i]n a constitutional setting that
distinguishes sharply between action and inaction, one's characterization of the misconduct
alleged under § 1983 may effectively decide the case." DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 204 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). In the dissent's view, "inaction [could] be every bit as abusive of power as
action ...." Id. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The distinction drawn between affirmative
acts and omissions has received extensive criticism elsewhere. See, e.g., Thomas A. Eaton &
Michael Wells, Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional Tort: DeShaney and Its Aftermath,
66 WASH. L. REv. 107, 109 n.9 (noting "the distinction between acts and omissions often
turns on how one poses the question").
12. See infra part III.
13. See infra part III.
14. See White v. Rockford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
15. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9. Prior to DeShaney, two circuit courts of appeals had
recognized an affirmative duty under the Constitution to protect children placed by the state in
foster care. See Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (holding
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lower federal courts that have ruled on this issue since DeShaney have
uniformly recognized a constitutional right to protection from unneces-
sary harm on the part of foster children involuntarily placed by the state
in a foster care situation. 6 The facts of a recent Eighth Circuit case are
illustrative. In Norfleet v. Arkansas Department of Human Services,17 the
plaintiff went on a two-day trip and left her two children with a neigh-
bor. 8 The plaintiff's four-year-old son, who had a history of asthma
problems, suffered an attack in his mother's absence.19 A hospital
treated him and gave him two different medications to take home.20
Later, the caretaker neighbor was arrested, and the children were placed
in the custody of a certified foster parent. 21 The foster parent failed to
supervise or direct the taking of the medication, and the boy suffered
another attack.22 The foster parent ordered the child to bed, but several
hours later called for emergency assistance.23 Tragically, the child died
affirmative duty under substantive Due Process Clause to provide protection and supervision
was created by virtue of "special relationship" between state and child placed in foster home
and that duty was breached only by showing of "deliberate indifference"), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1065 (1989); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141-42 (2d Cir.
1981) (allowing claim against city for abuse of child placed in foster care), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 864 (1983).
16. See, eg., Angela R. v. Clinton, 999 F.2d 320, 323-24 (8th Cir. 1993) (observing "class
members who are foster children in the State's custody have stronger constitutional claims
than abused or neglected children who have not been placed in foster care"); Norfleet v. Ar-
kansas Dep't of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1993) (recognizing "[c]ases from
this and other circuits clearly demonstrate that imprisonment is not the only custodial rela-
tionship in which the state must safeguard an individual's civil rights"); Yvonne L. v. New
Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 893 (10th Cir. 1992) (denying qualified immu-
nity to defendant officials as it was clearly established that "children in the custody of a state
had a constitutional right to be reasonably safe from harm"); K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846,
853 (7th Cir. 1990) (denying qualified immunity to extent complaint asserted "prima facie
right not to be placed with a foster parent who the state's caseworkers and supervisors know or
suspect is likely to abuse or neglect the foster child"); Meador v. Cabinet for Human Re-
sources, 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir.) (holding "due process extends the right to be free from
the infliction of unnecessary harm to children in state-regulated foster homes"), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 867 (1990); Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1439 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (recogniz-
ing creation of "special relationship" requiring provision of constitutionally adequate care
when state removes child from natural home and places under state supervision), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1040 (1990); LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 992-93 (D.D.C. 1991) (finding
rights of children in foster care analogous to rights of those involuntarily committed), aff'd,
990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
17. 989 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1993).
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in the early hours of the morning.24 The plaintiff, who returned home on
the evening before her son's death, learned the whereabouts of her chil-
dren from a department caseworker, was assured that her son was fine,
and was told that she would be reunited with both children the next
morning.25 Early the next morning she was informed of her son's
death.26
. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of qualified immunity27 to the Director of the Arkansas
Department of Human Services and the Department caseworker who
24. Id
25. Id
26. Id. at 293.
27. The Supreme Court has developed a doctrine of qualified immunity for state officials
sued in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Court held that "government officials performing discretionary func-
tions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known," id. at 818. Harlow was intended to objectify the qualified immunity
inquiry and make it possible for a judge to decide the availability of immunity as a matter of
law at an early stage in the litigation, generally on a motion for summary judgment. Id. at
819-20.
In Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), the Court made the specific facts sur-
rounding the officer's conduct relevant to the qualified immunity analysis. Even if the law
were found to be clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, the Court held that the
lower court should have addressed the question of whether a reasonable officer could have
believed his or her conduct to be lawful in light of the facts and information possessed by the
officer at the time. Id. at 640-41.
In two recent cases, the Court has further elaborated on the qualified immunity defense.
In Siegert v. Gilley, 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991), the Court established that the first inquiry in the
qualified immunity analysis should be whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a con-
stitutional right under the law as currently interpreted, id. at 1793. In Hunter v. Bryant, 112
S. Ct. 534 (1991) (per curiam), the Court emphasized that the qualified immunity issue is a
question of law that "ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial," id. at 537.
A denial of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on a question of law, is immedi-
ately appealable as a collateral order. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
Problems associated with the qualified immunity doctrine have received extensive treat-
ment elsewhere by this Author and others. See, e.g., Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A
User's Manual, 26 IND. L. REv. 187 (1993); Gary S. Gildin, Immunizing Intentional Viola-
tions of Constitutional Rights Through Judicial Legislation: The Extension of Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald to Section 1983 Actions, 38 EMORY L.J. 369 (1989); Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity
in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. REv. 597 (1989); Laura Oren,
Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights Legislation: Who Should Pay?, 50 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 935 (1989); David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court:
Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23 (1989);
Kathryn R. Urbonya, Problematic Standards of Reasonableness: Qualified Immunity in Sec-
tion 1983 Actions for a Police Officer's Use of Excessive Force, 62 TEMPLE L. REV. 61 (1989);
Henk J. Brands, Note, Qualified Immunity and the Allocation of Decision-Making Functions
Between Judge and Jury, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1045 (1990); Mary A. McKenzie, Note, The
Doctrine of Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Actions: Resolution of the Immunity Issue on
Summary Judgment, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 673 (1991).
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had been involved in the circumstances that resulted in the death of the
plaintiff's child.2" Relying on both pre- and post-DeShaney decisions in
the circuit,2 9 the court concluded that it was clearly established at the
time of the devastating occurrence that the state had a duty to provide
for the safety and medical needs of the plaintiff's child.30
The court in Norfleet explained that a child placed in foster care,
like a prisoner, is deprived of "freedom and ability to make decisions
about his own welfare, and must rely on the state to take care of his
needs." 3  Interestingly, however, the court proceeded to underscore that
the reason the child was placed in foster care was precisely because the
child was unable to care for himself without adult supervision and pro-
tection.32 Thus, the state's act of removing the child from free society
was not the cause of the child's inability to provide for his own needs and
protection and, therefore, was not the source of the duty to protect.33
Rather, the state owed a duty to the child because the state had assumed
control of the child's environment and responsibility for the child's wel-
fare, replacing whatever private source of protection the child may have
had in the "free" world.34
Although the result in Norfleet is to be commended, the rationale of
the decision may be construed so as to belie the reality of what criteria
are important in the affirmative duty cases. Fixation on the concept of
custody, with attempts to characterize situations so that they are analo-
gous to incarceration or institutionalization, have led plaintiffs to plead-
and some courts to insist upon-a showing of state action that has
caused the involuntary restriction of the plaintiff's freedom. If custody is
to be a threshold requirement in affirmative-duty cases, the notion of cus-
tody should not only be viewed in more expansive terms, encompassing
all situations where the state assumes responsibility for and control over
28. Norfleet, 989 F.2d at 290.
29. See, eg., Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(recognizing state's affirmative duty to protect citizens "in custodial and other settings in
which the state has limited the individuals' ability to care for themselves"), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1265 (1993); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging "possi-
bility that a constitutional duty to protect an individual against private violence may exist in a
non-custodial setting"); Wells v. Walker, 852 F.2d 368, 370 (8th Cir. 1988) (extending circuit's
previously narrow view of affirmative duty beyond strict confines of prison-like setting), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989).
30. Norfleet, 989 F.2d at 293.
31. Id.
32. Id
33. Id at 292.
34. Id at 293.
[Vol. 27:435
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an individual's environment, but also should be uncoupled from the re-
quirement that custody be of an involuntary nature.
If Taureen Norfleet, the young boy who died from an asthma attack,
had been "voluntarily" placed with the state by his mother, a number of
courts would hold that the state owed him no affirmative duty under the
Due Process Clause, even assuming that subsequent to his placement the
same events that led to his death unfolded.35 One of the first courts to
interpret DeShaney to require a finding of involuntary custody before an
affirmative duty of protection could be imposed, did so in the context of
foster care. In Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Department of Social
Services,36 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held under
DeShaney that when parents voluntarily place their child in the foster
care system, the state has no constitutional duty to protect the child
against private violence.37
Other courts have similarly focused on the involuntary nature of the
plaintiff's relationship with the state as a predicate to the finding of a
constitutional duty. In Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Center, Inc. ,38
the plaintiff, a voluntarily committed mental health patient, sued several
state officials who were charged with his care for serious injuries he sus-
tained when he jumped out of a van while being transported between
health facilities.39 The First Circuit, relying on DeShaney, rejected the
plaintiff's argument that his mental condition, "which may have made
him functionally dependent on his caretakers,"' imposed upon the state
a constitutional duty to provide for his safety and well-being.41 As a
voluntary patient, the plaintiff was not "in custody"; thus, the court con-
cluded that "[b]ecause the state did not commit [the plaintiff] involunta-
rily, it did not take an 'affirmative act' of restraining his liberty, an act
which may trigger a corresponding due process duty to assume a special
responsibility for his protection."'42
35. See, eg., Wilson v. Formigoni, No. 92C5063, 1993 WL 344322, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
9, 1993) (noting that courts have interpreted DeShaney's holding "to mean that involuntarily
committed patients have due process rights to reasonable care and safety while voluntarily
committed patients generally do not").
36. 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989). The facts and holding of
Milburn received extensive treatment by Professor Laura Oren in her excellent article. See
Laura Oren, DeShaney's UnFinished Business The Foster Child's Due Process Right to Safety,
69 N.C. L. REv. 113, 133-47 (1990).
37. Milburn, 871 F.2d at 476-78.
38. 961 F.2d 987 (1st Cir. 1992).
39. Id. at 989.
40. Id. at 992.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 991; see also Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, Inc., 921 F.2d 459,
465 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding state acquires affirmative duty under Fourteenth Amendment to
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The problem with emphasizing custody is the baggage that the con-
cept has come to encompass since DeShaney. The notion that one is not
"in custody" unless the state has taken some affirmative steps to hold the
person against his or her will makes any substantive due process duty to
protect turn on the status of an individual as a prisoner, an involuntarily
committed mental patient, or an involuntarily placed foster child. Cus-
tody, as a status rather than a situation, is an unsatisfactory indicator of
when a constitutional duty is owed. An interpretation of DeShaney that
would support treating two children in the same foster care situation dif-
ferently under the Constitution because one child was voluntarily placed
in the system is difficult to defend. Common sense and notions of basic
fairness dictate that all children, whether placed voluntarily or involun-
tarily in the state's care, should be entitled to equal rights under the Con-
stitution. The custody concept should be linked to the condition of being
in an environment subject to the state's control and supervision, rather
than to the process of how one got there.43
provide safe conditions only where mentally retarded person is taken into custody without
consent); Rogers v. City of Port Huron, No. 92-CV-75898-DT, 1993 WL 409729, at *5 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 5, 1993) (observing that "if a person's attendance at an event or area is voluntary,
and not in the state's compulsion, and that person was not physically placed there by the state,
the person cannot be considered to be in 'functional custody' "); Baby Neal v. Casey, 821 F.
Supp. 320, 334-35 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (noting that "[n]umerous courts have made this involuntary
versus voluntary distinction," and concluding "that Plaintiffs who have been involuntarily
placed in the custody of DHS may state a claim for violation of their substantive due process
rights based upon their right to freedom from harm under the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution"); Jordan v. Tennessee, 738 F. Supp. 258, 259.60 (M.D. Tenn.
1990) (holding that mentally retarded child, voluntarily committed to state institution by par-
ents, did not have substantive due process right to safe conditions).
43. See, eg., United States v. Pennsylvania, No. CIV.A.93-2094, 1993 WL 370570, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1993) (rejecting defendants' argument "that voluntarily confined patients
are not entitled to the constitutional right to treatment and care by virtue of the 'voluntariness'
of their initial confinement" and concluding that "the constitutional right to treatment or ha-
bilitation extends to both involuntarily and voluntarily confined residents alike"); Halderman
v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., No. CIV.A.74-1345, 1993 WL 342806, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
25, 1993) (noting DeShaney supported finding that residents of [state hospital] were involunta-
rily confined where "the Commonwealth defendants had affirmatively acted in accepting the
residents into [the state hospital] .... and in depriving them of their constitutional right to
minimally adequate habilitation"); McNamara v. Dukakis, No. CIV.A.90-1261 l-Z, 1990 WL
235439, at *10 (D. Mass. Dec. 27, 1990) (refusing to consider outpatient recipients in "con-
structive custody," viewing those in community residences as comparable to state-placed foster
children, and accepting expert testimony as to status of "unconditional voluntary patients"
that suggested "little practical difference between voluntarily and involuntarily committed pa-
tients in terms of their ability to act on their own behalf").
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B. Public School Context
The compulsion to wed the concepts of custody and involuntariness,
along with the emphasis upon restraint of freedom rather than assump-
tion of control and responsibility by the state, have led the majority of
courts to reject arguments that public schoolchildren should be viewed as
in the "functional custody" of the state during school hours. Thus, these
courts have held that the state does not owe a duty of protection from
harm inflicted by fellow students or other private actors.44 Three recent
circuit court opinions, presenting very different factual contexts, under-
score the difficulties inherent in an approach that concentrates on the
elements of custody, involuntariness, and restraint of freedom, rather
than control and culpability.
In D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School,45 the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, confronted a
"classic case of constitutional line drawing in a most excruciating factual
context.",46  The plaintiffs were two female students who attended a
graphic arts occupation class at Middle Bucks School.47 One of the
plaintiffs, D.R., a hearing-impaired student with related communications
problems, was sixteen at the time of the alleged conduct.48 She asserted
that over a five-month period she was sexually molested two to four
times per week by several male students in a unisex bathroom and a
darkroom, both of which were part of the graphic arts classroom in
44. It is well settled that schoolchildren have a liberty interest in their bodily integrity that
is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977). The school cases in which DeShaney is implicated must
be distinguished from those in which the alleged harm is attributed to a state actor, generally a
teacher or other school official. See Waechter v. School Dist. No. 14-030, 773 F. Supp. 1005,
1009 & n.5 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (finding child to be in custodial relationship with teacher).
Compare Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 724 (3d Cir. 1989) (opinion on
remand) (recognizing difference from DeShaney because injury, sexual molestation of plaintiff,
resulted from conduct of state employee, not private actor), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990)
with Gates v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 449, 996 F.2d 1035, 1042 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding, in
case of sexual assault of student by teacher, "no custom or policy of deliberate indifference to
or tacit authorization of the unconstitutional conduct practiced by [the teacher] could be at-
tributed to the school district") and Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 147 n.14
(5th Cir.) (noting that although "[t]he precise contours of a school official's duty, as it pertains
to injuries inflicted by someone other than a school teacher" was not before it but concluding
that "public school officials have a duty to police the misconduct of their subordinates and to
protect schoolchildren from hazards of which the school officials know or should know"), cert
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066, and vacated, 987 F.2d 231, and reh'g en banc granted, 987 F.2d 231
(5th Cir. 1992).
45. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
46. Id at 1365.
47. Id. at 1366.
48. Id. at 1366 n.5, 1370.
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which she had an assigned class.49 The other plaintiff, L.H., seventeen at
the time in question, claimed to have been likewise molested two to three
times per week over a similar period of time."° The molestation, which
consisted of "offensive touching of their breasts and genitalia, sodomiza-
tion and forced acts of fellatio,"51 was claimed to have taken place during
school hours, at a time when the student teacher "was or should have
been in the classroom... and either heard or should have heard the
incidents taking place."52
The plaintiffs sued the school defendants, asserting four different
theories of constitutional liability. 3 The first theory claimed that a spe-
cial relationship existed between the plaintiffs and the school defendants
while the plaintiffs were in attendance at school, giving rise to an affirma-
tive duty to protect the plaintiffs from the type of harm inflicted by the
male students.5 4 In an effort to meet a stringent reading of DeShaney,
the plaintiffs argued that "Pennsylvania's scheme of compulsory attend-
ance and the school defendants' exercise of in locoparentis authority over
their pupils so restrain schoolchildren's liberty that plaintiffs can be con-
sidered to have been in state 'custody' during school hours for Four-
teenth Amendment purposes.""5
Grounding the argument for an affirmative duty in an analogy to
involuntary institutionalization automatically excluded the plaintiff L.H.
from the scope of any duty that might exist, since Pennsylvania's com-
pulsory attendance law applied only until a child reached seventeen years
of age. 6 As for the plaintiff D.R., the majority of the court rejected the
analogy between compulsory school attendance and imprisonment or in-




53. Id at 1368-77.
54. Id at 1368. The second theory of liability was based on a snake-pit rationale, claiming
that the defendants had created the danger that caused harm to the plaintiffs. Id. This theory
is discussed infra part III. The third theory claimed the existence of an official policy, custom,
or practice that caused the constitutional deprivations. Id Finally, plaintiffs alleged a con-
spiracy by defendants to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. Id.
55. Id. at 1370. The district court had held that compulsory attendance laws created a
custodial relationship between schoolchildren and the state, thereby mandating an affirmative
constitutional duty to provide protection. Id at 1367. The court concluded, however, that
plaintiffs' allegations were insufficient to establish a breach of the duty through reckless indif-
ference to plaintiffs' rights by the school defendants. D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational
Technical Sch., Nos. CIV.A.90-3018, 90-3060, 1991 WL 14082, at * 1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 1991).
A Third Circuit panel affirmed the decision but rejected the establishment of a special custo-
dial relationship in the public school setting. D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Sch.,
Nos. 91-1136, 91-1137, 1991 WL 276292 (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 1991).
56. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1370.
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voluntary commitment, concluding that schoolchildren are not in the
type of physical custody envisioned by DeShaney, in the sense of being
subject to "full time severe and continuous state restriction of liberty." 7
The majority stressed that parents remain the primary caretakers respon-
sible for meeting the basic needs of their children, and are free to remove
their children from school if the welfare of their children is threatened . 8
This fact made the situation of schoolchildren unlike that of prisoners or
involuntary mental patients.5 9
57. Id. at 1371-72.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1373. In so holding, the Third Circuit's opinion was in agreement with the only
other court of appeals to address the issue at that time. See J.0. v. Alton Community United
Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting argument that compulsory at-
tendance laws made schoolchildren, like mental patients and prisoners, unable to provide for
their own basic needs and are therefore owed affirmative duty of protection by state).
Other circuits have since adopted views consistent with those of the Third and Seventh
Circuits. See, eg., Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., No. 92-2452, 1993 WL 406464, at *2
(8th Cir. Oct. 13, 1993) (agreeing with Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits that "state-man-
dated school attendance does not entail so restrictive a custodial relationship as to impose
upon the State the same duty to protect it owes to prison inmates... or to the involuntarily
institutionalized.... ")'; Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 1992) (determining
that "compulsory attendance laws do not create an affirmative constitutional duty to protect
students from the private actions of third parties while they attend school"), cert denied, 113
S. Ct. 1266 (1993); see also B.M.H. v. School Bd., No. Civ.A.2:92CV1221, 1993 WL 383559, at
*3 (E.D. Va. Sept. 23, 1993) (rejecting argument that child attending public school because of
"state mandatory attendance law and who makes her teachers aware of a threat to her safety is
in such a relationship with those teachers and the school system as to create an affirmative
duty upon them to protect her under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause"); Doe
v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., No. C-93-0123-EFL, 1993 WL 359872, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30,
1993) (concluding "[c]ompulsory school attendance laws do not make schools the functional
equivalent of prisons. The court holds that, in general, for purposes of section 1983 liability,
no special relationship exists between school officials and students such that school officials
have a constitutional duty to protect students from the acts of other students"); Holman v.
School Dist., No. CIV.A.92-6846, 1993 WL 197445, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 1993) (determin-
ing relationship between socially and emotionally disturbed student and school district "was
not sufficiently custodial to trigger an affirmative duty on the part of the school district to
protect him from the private acts of third parties"); Hunter v. Carbondale Area Sch. Dist., 829
F. Supp. 714, 720 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (concluding "[p]arents are and remain the primary caretak-
ers of students even though state laws require the students' presence in school"); Elliott v. New
Miami Bd. of Educ., 799 F. Supp. 818, 823 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (holding relationship of state with
students of public schools is not same as relationship with prisoners and patients of mental
institutions and that failure to prevent other students from abusing plaintiff did not give rise to
liability under § 1983); Russell v. Fannin County Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp. 1576, 1583 (N.D.
Ga.) (holding "[s]choolchildren are not like mental patients and prisoners such that a state has
an affirmative duty to protect them"), aff'd, 981 F.2d 1263 (11th Cir. 1992); Arroyo v. Pla,
748 F. Supp. 56, 61 (D.P.R. 1990) (deciding that although school official may have known of
other violent incidents that had taken place on school premises, no constitutional duty existed
to protect student from injury caused by another student).
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Finally, in rejecting the custody basis for finding a duty of protec-
tion in these circumstances, the court distinguished the foster care con-
text, concluding that any analogy to foster care was "not decisive. '
The court explained that the relationship between the state and foster
children exists by virtue of an afflirmative act of the state in locating the
children and placing them with foster families. 61 The state, through the
foster family, assumes responsibility for the children's basic needs. 62 For
the public school student, however, "required to spend only 180 six-hour
days in the classroom per year[,] .. parents or others remain a child's
primary caretakers and decisionmakers." 63
60. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1372.
61. Id
62. Id
63. Id In Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1993), the Third Circuit
found D.R. controlling in a case that determined whether the superintendent of schools had a
duty to protect six-, seven-, and eight-year-old girls from alleged sexual molestation by their
school bus driver, id at 714. The plaintiffs looked to the superintendent's liability under
DeShaney as the bus driver was found not to be a state actor because he was employed by a
private entity under contract with the school district. Id at 709-11. Because the students
were not compelled to ride the school bus and their parents were "free" to arrange for other
modes of transportation, the court determined that "the plaintiffs here were less affected by
state restraints at the time of their alleged injuries than was D.R." and concluded that no
affirmative duty of protection existed under the Constitution. Id. at 714. Judge Scirica, con-
curring in the opinion, expressed some reservation about the situation being governed by D.R.
Finding the facts "more compelling" than D.R., Judge Scirica made the following observation:
I recognize we must draw lines to refine the state action requirement and the special
relationship of care developed in [DeShaney]. But applied here, these principles lead
to a result that belies the gravity of the constitutional claims involved. Denying these
§ 1983 claims also ignores the practical realities of this case-the necessity for small
school districts to contract out bus service, the reliance of families in rural areas upon
school buses, and the defenselessness of young girls riding a school bus. When claims
like these fall through the cracks, § 1983 seems less than the powerful tool to vindi-
cate constitutional rights it was designed to be.
Id at 715 (Scirica, J., concurring).
In Holman, 1993 WL 197445, the district court relied on both D.R. and Black in finding
that the relationship between a socially and emotionally disturbed student and the school dis-
trict "was not sufficiently custodial to trigger an affirmative duty on the part of the school
district to protect him from the private acts of third parties," id. at *3. The case involved a
nine-year-old boy who was killed by a car as he exited a public transportation bus on his way
to school. Id at *1. The boy's parents argued that the school district owed him a duty to
provide bus transportation to and from school and that the failure to do so breached the boy's
constitutional right to be free from injury to his person. Id.
For another example, see Hunter v. Carbondale Area Sch. Dist., 829 F. Supp. 714 (M.D.
Pa. 1993). In Hunter, a seventh-grade special education student was attacked and pursued by
other students after a detention period at the end of the school day. The chase led to a stream
where the boy drowned in his attempt to escape. Id. at 716-17. In addressing plaintiff's argu-
ment based on a theory of functional custody, the court concluded that
[i]n the present case the Defendants' authority over the Decedent during the school
day cannot be said to create the type of physical custody necessary to bring it within
the special relationship noted in DeShaney and D.R. . . . especially when all channels
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Chief Judge Sloviter, in a persuasive dissent, criticized the majority's
unwillingness to recognize any situation in which schoolchildren might
be entitled to a substantive due process duty of protection by the state."
The dissent underscored the disingenuousness of much of the rationale
supporting the majority opinion. Giving a more expansive reading to
DeShaney's reference to "restraint of personal liberty''6 as a predicate to
any substantive due process duty to protect, the dissent disparaged the
majority's holding "that the duty to protect can be triggered only by
involuntary, round-the-clock legal custody."66
In an attempt to satisfy DeShaney's emphasis on the involuntariness
of the constraint imposed on the individual's freedom to provide for his
or her own needs, the dissent objected to the majority's refusal to ac-
knowledge the real force of compulsory education laws. 7 The majority's
conclusion that parents may choose to send their children to private
schools, educate them at home, or remove them from the public school
for certain reasons,68 reflects an incredible lack of connection with life in
the "real" world.69 As the dissent noted, "For the vast majority of chil-
dren of school age, this is no choice at all."'70
The dissent obviously felt obligated to make the case for compulsory
attendance laws satisfying any involuntary restraint requirement imposed
by DeShaney. However, it is clear that the duty to protect recognized by
the dissent was grounded more in the nature of the relationship that the
state had with children who were in attendance at school than in any
state laws compelling them to be there. Chief Judge Sloviter, writing in
dissent, would have held
that the state compulsion that students attend school, the status
of most students as minors whose judgment is not fully mature,
for communication to the outside were not totally closed. There is no evidence in the
present case that the Decedent was forced or intimidated by the Defendants to report
for detention. The Decedent could have decided not to report to detention for the
day.
Id. at 720.
64. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1377-84 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
65. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
66. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1379 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1379-81 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
68. Iad. at 1371 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
69. Id. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1380 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). The dissent found the majority's reasoning
analogous to an argument concerning "choice versus compulsion" rejected by the Supreme
Court in Lee v. Weisman, in which the Court observed that "'[1]aw reaches past formalism.
And to say a teenage student has a real choice not to attend her high school graduation is
formalistic in the extreme.'" Id. at 1380 n.5 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Lee v. Weis-
man, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992)).
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the discretion extended by the state to schools to control stu-
dent behavior, and the pervasive control exercised by the
schools over their students during the period of time they are in
school, combine to create the type of special relationship which
imposes a constitutional duty on the schools to protect the lib-
erty interests of students while they are in the state's functional
custody.
71
The dissent appeared willing but unable to totally abandon the shackles
of the involuntary restraint predicate to finding an affirmative duty. As
Chief Judge Sloviter implied,72 however, the technical, legal requirement
of compulsory attendance makes little sense as the sine qua non for an
affirmative duty owed to schoolchildren who are in fact, whether volun-
tarily or involuntarily, in the state's care and under the state's control
while in attendance.7 3 Any insistence that a legal compulsion to attend
school be present before an affirmative duty to protect is recognized
would result in the drawing of irrational and arbitrary classifications de-
fining the circumstances and situations in which students are afforded
constitutional protection.74 The key to the duty owed should be the
state's assumption of responsibility for the care and control of students
while they are physically present in a state-created and controlled
environment.75
71. Id. at 1377 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). Judge Becker, expressing agreement with most
of Chief Judge Sloviter's analysis, resisted the adoption of any "bright-line rule," but would
have held on the facts of this case that the school had a constitutional duty to protect the
plaintiffs from the harm to which they were exposed. Id. at 1384 (Becker, J., dissenting).
72. Chief Judge Sloviter observed that "[a]lthough L.H. at seventeen may not have been
compelled to attend school, I see no reason to draw an age distinction between students who,
in fact, are attending a state school." Id. at 1379 n.3 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1379 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
74. For example, a constitutional duty linked to compulsory attendance would totally ex-
clude any situations encompassed by after-school, extracurricular activities. See, e.g., Fenster-
maker v. Nesfedder, 802 F. Supp. 1258, 1265 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (concluding that "DeShaney
cannot be the basis for a federal cause of action against a coach when a wrestler, who is not
obliged in any way to participate in an extracurricular wrestling program, alleges that he was
injured during a bout"); Reeves v. Besonen, 754 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (con-
cluding school owes no constitutional duty of protection to students against assault by other
students inflicted during ride on school bus in connection with wholly voluntary participation
on school football team). Nor would the duty apply to conduct occurring during the type of
optional, "extended day" programs that more and more public school systems are offering.
75. See Stephen F. Huefner, Note, Affirmative Duties in the Public Schools After
DeShaney, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1940, 1957 (1990) (arguing that, in school context, courts
should look to "implications of custodial control, rather than only to control itself, because it is




Because the dissent concluded that the facts alleged were sufficient
to establish that an affirmative duty of protection was owed, it also had to
address the question of whether the facts, as they pertained to a breach of
that duty, were adequate to withstand a motion to dismiss. 76 Given the
allegations, which included assertions that the student teacher in charge
of the classroom witnessed some of the offensive conduct and that other
school officials knew about the problems in the graphic arts classroom,
the dissent found that the complaint "sufficiently allege[d] deliberate and
reckless indifference by school officials to the safety and physical well-
being of the students while they were in the functional custody of the
school."
77
In Maldonado v. Josey,78 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
joined the Third79 and Seventh80 Circuits in holding that "compulsory
attendance laws do not create an affirmative constitutional duty to pro-
tect students from the private actions of third parties while they attend
school."8" The facts of Maldonado were very different from the facts of
D.R. Mark Maldonado, an eleven-year-old fifth grader, died of strangu-
lation when he became caught on his bandanna in a cloakroom next to
his classroom. 2
This was not a case that required a decision based on arbitrary line
drawing concerning the scope of any affirmative duty the state may have
toward schoolchildren after DeShaney. It was not necessary to categori-
cally reject a constitutional duty to protect schoolchildren to conclude
76. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1378 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
77. Id, (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
78. 975 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1992).
79. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1372 (holding "school defendants' authority over D.R. during the
school day cannot be said to create the type of physical custody necessary to bring it within the
special relationship noted in DeShaney").
80. J.O. v. Alton Community United Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1990)
(concluding "[s]chool children are not like mental patients and prisoners such that the state
has an affirmative duty to protect them").
81. Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 732 (footnote omitted). The court noted two district court
decisions that had reached the same conclusion. Id. at 732 n.5; see Dorothy J. v. Little Rock
Sch. Dist., 794 F. Supp. 1405, 1415 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (rejecting view that school had constitu-
tionally mandated duty to protect child from violence by other student where child was not in
state custody or control "either directly or by virtue of school attendance laws, nor did the
state remove him involuntarily from his home and place him in the [special] program"), aff'd,
No. 92-2452, 1993 WL 406464, at *2 (8th Cir. Oct. 13, 1993); Doe v. Douglas County Sch.
Dist. RE-I, 770 F. Supp. 591, 593-94 (D. Colo. 1991) (concluding no special relationship ex-
isted between school district and student who had been sexually molested by school
psychologist).
82. Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 728. The facts indicated that the boy had been in the cloak-
room unsupervised for approximately 20 minutes, though no reason was provided for his hav-
ing been sent there. See id
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that the plaintiffs had stated no constitutional claim upon which relief
could be granted. Judge Seymour, in a concurring opinion, concluded
that the court should recognize "some affirmative duty on the part of
public school teachers to protect students who are in the total care of the
school during the period of their compulsory attendance."83
Even though he acknowledged that a duty was owed, Judge Sey-
mour would have affirmed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment on behalf of the defendant teacher based on the plaintiff's failure to
raise a material fact with respect to the issue of breach of that duty since
there were no facts alleged from which a jury could have found that the
teacher had been deliberately indifferent to Mark Maldonado's exposure
to potential danger. 4
The concurrence in Maldonado, like the dissent in D.R., appeared
to be much more in tune with the reality of the situation confronting
both schoolchildren and parents vis-A-vis their relationship with the state
in the matter of public education.
Judge Seymour addressed the argument that a schoolchild-unlike a
prisoner, involuntarily committed mental patient, or child involuntarily
placed in the state's foster care system-is not in "custody" because the
child's parents remain responsible for providing the child's basic needs.
She commented:
Obviously, a parent does not lose all control over, nor all re-
sponsibility for, satisfying a child's basic needs simply as a re-
sult of school attendance laws. But younger children are
incapable of providing for their own basic needs; they depend
on parents or other caretakers to provide for them. Even older
children may be forced by school disciplinary procedures and
rules to rely on authority figures at school to protect them from
harm. I cannot fathom who, other than a teacher or other
school staff member, is capable of ensuring the "reasonable
safety" of schoolchildren during the school day and class
periods."-
The requirement adopted by the Third,8" Seventh,87 and Tenth88
Circuits-that a child be involuntarily in the total and full-time physical
83. Id at 735 (Seymour, J., concurring).
84. Id. (Seymour, J., concurring). As Judge Seymour explained: "I do not believe the
Constitution requires an elementary school teacher to protect her students from unknown and
unforeseen harms, or to follow the minute-by-minute progress of her eleven-year-old charges."
I (Seymour, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 734-35 (Seymour, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
86. D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992)
(en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
[Vol. 27:435
January 1994] INTERPRETING DESHANEY
custody of the state before the relationship gives rise to an affirmative
duty to protect-serves as an arbitrary, unsatisfactory, and unnecessary
screening device for substantive due process claims in the school context.
To acknowledge that school teachers and officials are unquestionably the
primary caretakers of children during school hours and school activities
and to impose upon such caretakers a constitutional duty of protecting
schoolchildren from known and foreseeable harms is not to open the
floodgates of constitutional litigation.8 9 As Chief Judge Sloviter noted,
case law doctrines are in place that significantly limit the potential liabil-
ity of state officials for substantive due process violations.90
In Doe v. Taylor Independent School District,91 involving a factual
context quite different from both D.R. and Maldonado, the Fifth Circuit
became the first court of appeals since DeShaney to decide that school-
children are in the functional custody of school officials, who thus "have
a duty to police the misconduct of their subordinates and to protect
schoolchildren from hazards of which the school officials know or should
know."92 Doe involved the sexual molestation of a fifteen-year-old high
87. J.O. v. Alton Community United Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1990).
88. Maldonado, 975 F.2d 727.
89. In Dorothy J. v. Little Rock School District, 794 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. Ark. 1992),
aff'd, No. 92-2452, 1993 WL 406464, at *2 (8th Cir. Oct. 13, 1993), the court, in rejecting a
broad view of custody based on compulsory attendance laws, articulated the floodgate fear
that [this] view would expand constitutional duties of care and protection to millions
of schoolchildren. School officials would be subject to section 1983 liability anytime
a child skinned his knee on the playground or was beat-up by the school bully, so
long as the requisite "state of mind" was shown. More seriously, with the epidemic
of deadly violence on many school campuses today, teachers would be constitution-
ally obliged to assume roles similar to policemen or even prison guards in protecting
students from other students. The precise contours of an affirmative duty to care and
protect would be much more difficult to define in public schools.
I at 1414.
90. In her dissent in D.R., Chief Judge Sloviter noted:
[A] state official's potential liability for violations of substantive due process has al-
ready been circumscribed by decisions imposing high standards of culpability, limita-
tions on the type of conduct for which state entities can be held responsible, and
qualified immunity for individual defendants. These decisions make it unlikely that a
holding that schools have a duty to protect schoolchildren while they are in the func-
tional custody of the school will markedly expand the liability of the school districts.
D.R., 972 F.2d at 1384 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
91. 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992), reh'g en banc granted, 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993).
92. Id. at 147. Some federal district courts recognize a duty owed to schoolchildren based
on their being in the functional custody of the state by virtue of compulsory attendance laws.
See, eg., Lichtler v. County of Orange, 813 F. Supp. 1054, 1056 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting "[a]
state imposing compulsory attendance upon schoolchildren must take reasonable steps to pro-
tect those required to attend from foreseeable risks of personal injury or death"); Waechter v.
School Dist. No. 14-030, 773 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 & n.5 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (determining child
was in custodial relationship with teacher); Pagano by Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714
F. Supp. 641, 642-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding elementary school students required to attend
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school student by one of her teachers.93 The Fifth Circuit, hearing an
interlocutory appeal from the district court's denial of qualified immu-
nity for the school district's superintendent and the school's principal,
94
addressed the question of whether these officials violated the plaintiff's
constitutional rights by not protecting her from the misconduct of her
teacher.
95
The court explained that the matter of supervisory liability96 could
be approached from two perspectives.97 First, the officials could be
found liable for the injury inflicted by the teacher if they knew or should
have known of the teacher's unconstitutional conduct and yet deliber-
ately chose not to take any remedial action.98 Alternatively, the court
held that school officials could be liable for the constitutional wrongs
perpetrated by their subordinates based on the breach of a duty to pro-
school were owed some duty of care by defendants to prevent physical and verbal abuse by
other students); see also Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1337 (6th Cir. 1993)
(noting protected liberty interest of schoolchildren in personal security "may turn on the fact
that public school students are compelled by state law to attend school and are not permitted
to withdraw from situations posing the risk of personal injury").
93. Doe, 975 F.2d at 138.
94. Id. at 141.
95. The court first determined that sexual molestation by a teacher violated the plaintiff's
clearly established right to bodily integrity under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 141-44.
96. As the court noted in Clay v. Conlee, 815 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1987), "when supervi-
sory liability is imposed, it is imposed against the supervisory official in his individual capacity
for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordi-
nates," i. at 1170.
As with a local government defendant, a supervisor cannot be held liable under § 1983 on
a respondeat superior basis. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58
(1978).
97. Doe, 975 F.2d at 144-45.
98. I d; accord Jane Doe "A" v. Special Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1990)
(holding school officials could be constitutionally liable when they are shown to have been
deliberately indifferent to pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by subordinates); Stonek-
ing v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 724-25 (3d Cir.) (stating school official could be
liable for "maintain[ing] a practice, custom, or policy of reckless indifference to instances of
known or suspected sexual abuse of students by teachers"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990);
see also Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137-38 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding supervisors liable
when inaction amounts to reckless disregard of, deliberate indifference to, or tacit authoriza-
tion of constitutional violations); Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 562 (1st
Cir. 1989) (stating supervisor's conduct or inaction must be shown to amount to deliberate,
reckless, or callous indifference to constitutional rights of others); Meriwether v. Coughlin, 879
F.2d 1037, 1048 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding "supervisory liability may be imposed when an official
has actual or constructive notice of unconstitutional practices and demonstrates 'gross negli-
gence' or 'deliberate indifference' by failing to act"); Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 274
(7th Cir. 1986) (establishing supervisory liability required showing that "official knowingly,
willfully, or at least recklessly caused the alleged deprivation by his action or failure to act").
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tect the schoolchildren. 99 The court grounded the duty to protect in the
state's compulsory attendance laws, which operate to separate children
from the persons who would otherwise bear responsibility for their safety
and well-being."c° In justifying the imposition of the duty, the court
noted that
[p]arents, guardians, and the children themselves have little
choice but to rely on the school officials for some measure of
protection and security while in school and can reasonably ex-
pect that the state will provide a safe school environment. To
hold otherwise would call into question the constitutionality of
compulsory attendance statutes, for we would be permitting a
state to compel parents to surrender their offspring to the
tender mercies of school officials without exacting some assur-
ance from the state that school officials will undertake the role
of guardian that parents might not otherwise relinquish, even
temporarily. 101
Thus, Doe eliminates one of the fictions that has become entangled with
the concept of custody in the school context. The notion that custody is
an all-or-nothing proposition has prevented the recognition of the school
officials' affirmative duty to protect. The Fifth Circuit does not require
that custody be characterized by full-time and total assumption of physi-
cal control over a person. 10 2 While an individual in the full-time custody
of the state when incarcerated, institutionalized, or in foster care is
thereby dependent upon the state for all basic needs, schoolchildren are
in the state's custody on a part-time basis. Thus, while in the school
environment these children are entitled to rely upon school officials to
provide some level of protection from known dangers.
Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit anchored the affirmative duty in the
condition that the state had mandated the child's presence in school
through compulsory attendance laws. 10 3 Thus, the condition of custody
99. Doe, 975 F.2d at 145. In a pre-DeShaney case, involving a school bus driver who was
charged with constitutional liability for failing to break up a fight between schoolchildren on
the bus, the Fifth Circuit held that the driver was "entrusted with the care of students attend-
ing school under Texas's compulsory education statute" and that he could be held liable for
failing to protect or render aid to the schoolchild if such failure "rose to the level of callous
indifference and was a cause of injury." Lopez v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 351, 356
(5th Cir. 1987). The court also suggested that school officials could be held liable if it were
shown that a widespread problem involving fights on school buses was met with no response
on the part of the officials with respect to proper training of the bus drivers. Id. at 354.
100. Doe, 975 F.2d at 146-47.
101. Id. at 147.
102. See id. at 146-47.
103. Id. at 144 n.6, 147.
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must be imposed involuntarily before the duty arises." °4 As already
noted, this distinction between voluntary and involuntary custody makes
little practical sense.' It is formalistic at best, arbitrary and irrational
at worst.
Doe is significant, of course, not only for what the case holds, but for
what it does not hold. The court clearly reserved any opinion on the
"precise contours of a school official's duty, as it pertains to injuries in-
flicted by someone other than a school teacher (or other
subordinate)."'' 06 The court was quick to clarify that its decision would
not result in school officials' constitutional liability "in the ordinary
course for injuries to students inflicted by fellow students."' 1 7 Yet, the
rationale of the court's opinion would arguably support an affirmative
duty on school officials to refrain from deliberate indifference to known
or foreseeable threats, from whatever source, to the safety and well-being
of school children when the children are separated from their primary
caretakers and the school has assumed that responsibility.'
0 8
104. See id. at 147.
105. See supra part II.B.
106. Doe, 975 F.2d at 147 n.14.
107. Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
108. To the extent that the Fifth Circuit's opinion leaves open the question of a school
official's affirmative duty to protect schoolchildren from harm inflicted by persons other than
state actors, the decision can be distinguished from that of the court in C.M. v. Southeast
Delco School District, 828 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1993). In CM., a middle school special
education student alleged that he was sexually, physically, and verbally abused by one of his
teachers. Id. at 1180-81. As the Fifth Circuit did in Doe, the district court discussed the
matter of the school officials' liability for the injury inflicted upon the plaintiff under two differ-
ent theories. See id. at 1184, 1186. First, the court held that
[i]n light of what defendants allegedly knew about [the teacher's] conduct,.., a jury
could reasonably conclude that the actions taken or not taken by defendants in re-
sponse to reports of [the teacher's] conduct amounted to a custom, practice, or policy
of deliberate indifference to [his] actions and to plaintiff's constitutional rights.
Id at 1185. Second, the court addressed the issue of whether school officials had an affirma-
tive duty to protect schoolchildren from constitutional violations committed by teachers or
other school employees. Id at 1188. Finding the identity of the alleged perpetrator as a state
actor to be determinative, the court concluded that
the affirmative-duty line should be drawn at state action. That is, in light of Stonek-
ing and D.R., DeShaney stands only for the proposition that states have no affirma-
tive duty to protect people from private actors, rather than the broader proposition
that states have no duty to protect people from actors who are the state's own.
Id. at 1189. In a related case, K.L. v. Southeast Delco School District, 828 F. Supp. 1192
(E.D. Pa. 1993), the court further refined its reasoning in C.M., making clear that the case held
only that "public school districts and school officials have an affirmative duty to protect stu-
dents from state-employed teachers," id. at 1195. The court expressed no opinion
as to whether the state might have an affirmative duty to protect students from, for
example, school janitors or cafeteria workers, or whether the state might have an
affirmative duty to protect citizens from police officers, trash collectors, or any other
state employees outside the public school system. The holding [of C.M. ] is limited to
teachers, whom the state has placed in sensitive positions involving close, daily con-
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The emphasis in the school cases, no less so than in the incarcera-
tion and institutionalization cases, should be on the factors of culpability
and causation. As schoolchildren are in the custody and care of school
officials while attending school-whether or not that attendance is com-
pelled-those officials should have an affirmative duty under the Consti-
tution to provide an environment that is, at least, not deliberately
indifferent to the safety and health needs of those children.
C. Public Housing and Employment Contexts
Unlike the foster care and public school contexts, courts have not
been receptive to an affirmative duty under the Due Process Clause to
protect persons living in public housing or those employed by a public
employer.
In Dawson v. Milwaukee Housing Authority,10 9 the plaintiff, a resi-
dent of city public housing, was shot and seriously injured by another
resident. 10 The plaintiff argued that his presence in publicly subsidized
housing was the functional equivalent of being in custody, thereby creat-
ing a constitutional duty to protect him from harm at the hands of pri-
vate actors."' In refusing to equate "subsidy with custody," Judge
Easterbrook relied on pre-DeShaney precedent from the Seventh Circuit
that held that the Due Process Clause does not guarantee safety in the
public workplace." 2 In Collins v. City of Harker Heights,"3 the Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed that "the Due Process Clause does not im-
pose an independent federal obligation upon municipalities to provide
certain minimal levels of safety and security in the workplace."1 '4
tact with children, and over whom school administrators have direct supervisory
authority.
Id. at 1196.
109. 930 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1991).
110. Id. at 1283.
111. Id. at 1284.
112. Id. at 1285 (citing Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 510-11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 994 (1986)); accord Washington v. District of Columbia, 802 F.2d 1478, 1481-82 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (finding prison guard has no constitutional right to safe working environment);
McClary v. O'Hare, 786 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting improper actions by employer are
not tantamount to constitutional violations simply because employer is government official).
113. 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992).
114. Id. at 1071. The plaintiff's husband was employed by the city in its sanitation and
sewer department and was asphyxiated while clearing a sewer line. Id.; see also Walls v. City
of Detroit, 993 F.2d 1548 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding plaintiff's attempt to distinguish City of
Harker Heights "unavailing, because it misunderstands one of the central tenets of the
Supreme Court's holding in that case: the Constitution does not guarantee police officers and
other municipal employees a workplace free of unreasonable risks of harm"); Searles v. South-
eastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 990 F.2d 789, 792 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting plaintiff's argument
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DeShaney and Collins no doubt negate any argument that there is a
general substantive due process right to safety in public workplaces or
housing based on some notion of functional custody. However, support
exists for imposing constitutional liability on government defendants in
noncustodial contexts, where persons claim to have been harmed by ex-
posure to risks created or increased by government employees or officials.
III. THE SNAKE-PIT CASES
In concluding that the state had not deprived Joshua DeShaney of
any constitutionally protected rights, the Supreme Court suggested that
the result might have been different if the state had played a role in creat-
ing the dangers to which Joshua was exposed or had increased his vul-
nerability to these dangers."' This Article now turns to an examination
of cases in which courts have found an affirmative duty to protect, in
situations admittedly noncustodial, based on a state-created-danger or




DeShaney makes clear that the state's mere awareness of a risk of
harm to an individual will not suffice to impose an affirmative duty to
provide protection." 7 If the state creates the danger confronting the in-
dividual, however, it may then have a corresponding duty to protect.
The state-created-danger theory for imposing an affirmative duty has
been raised in a number of the school cases. As one federal district court
has noted:
The relationship between a state and its students does not
constitute the special custodial relationship referred to in
DeShaney. The absence of an affirmative constitutional duty to
protect its students does not, however, mean that a state may
create a dangerous situation and place students in harm's way
"that the Constitution imposes a duty on a municipal transit authority to provide its passen-
gers with minimal levels of safety and security during transportation").
115. DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989).
116. No clear line separates the state-created danger cases from the enhancement-of-risk
cases, and most snake-pit situations may fairly be characterized as containing elements of both.
This Article treats these cases as categorically distinct only for purposes of organization and
discussion.
117. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 ("The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's
knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him....").
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without acquiring a corresponding duty to protect those stu-
dents from resulting violations of their constitutional rights.118
In addition to their functional custody argument,1 19 the plaintiffs in
D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School 120 raised the
state-created-danger theory. They alleged that the school officials cre-
ated an environment in which the plaintiffs were subject to repeated sex-
ual and physical abuse by other students.121 The court first noted that
"the state-created danger theory is predicated upon the state's affirmative
acts which work to plaintiffs' detriments in terms of exposure to dan-
ger." '122 The Third Circuit then distinguished the plaintiffs' principal
cases for imposing liability by observing that in each of those cases, the
state acted affirmatively to create the danger encountered.12
The court's conclusion that no duty to protect existed in D.R., how-
ever, appeared to rest not on the lack of the defendants' affirmative acts,
but rather on the perceived unrelatedness between the defendants' acts
118. Robbins v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 56, 807 F. Supp. 11, 13 (D. Me. 1992).
119. See supra notes 45-77 and accompanying text.
120. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
121. Id at 1373. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants created or increased
their risk of harm by
(1) failing to report to the parents or other authorities the misconduct resulting in
abuse to plaintiffs; (2) placing the class under the control of an inadequately trained
and unsupervised student teacher; (3) failing to demand proper conduct of the stu-
dent defendants; and (4) failing to investigate and put a stop to the physical and
sexual misconduct.
Id.
122. Id. at 1374.
123. Id. The plaintiffs relied heavily on three post-DeShaney cases recognizing the state-
created-danger theory as a basis for § 1983 liability outside the custodial context. See Corne-
lius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 359 (11th Cir. 1989) (concluding defendants
owed plaintiff duty of protection where they had created risk of harm to plaintiff by exposing
her to inmates who were inadequately supervised), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990); Wood v.
Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding duty to provide protection where
police officer put plaintiff in harm's way when he arrested driver of car in which plaintiff was
passenger, impounded vehicle, and left plaintiff stranded in high-crime area), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 938 (1990); Swader v. Virginia, 743 F. Supp. 434, 435, 444 (E.D. Va. 1990) (finding
affirmative duty where defendants created risk of harm by permitting inmate serving life sen-
tence for rape to work unsupervised on prison property where prison employees and their
families were required to live).
In a recent case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that DeShaney was not
controlling where a high-speed police pursuit resulted in the deaths of innocent third parties
who collided with the vehicle being pursued. The court noted that "[t]his type of case is
different from DeShaney, where state actors failed to intervene in a situation that they knew or
should have known was dangerous but that they played no part in creating. Here ... the
police actively created the danger that resulted in the plaintiffs' injuries." Fagan v. City of
Vineland, Nos. 92-5481, 92-5482, 92-5551, 92-5594, 1993 WL 290386, at *28 n.5 (3d Cir. Aug.
5, 1993) (citation omitted), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, Nos. 92-5481, 92-5482, 92-5551,
92-5594, 1993 WL 335390 (3d Cir. Sept. 2, 1993).
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and the plaintiffs' harm. The court opined that although the defendants'
conduct "may have created a recognizable risk that plaintiffs would re-
ceive little education in that class, and perhaps, physical injury due to the
roughhousing[,] [p]laintiffs did not suffer harm... from that kind of
foreseeable risk." 124 Thus, although the court underscored the action/
inaction line as the constitutionally significant distinction between D.R.
and the other state-created-danger cases, the opinion's language belies a
greater concern with the element of causation.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit expressed a similar
concern in Dorothy J. v. Little Rock School District.1 2 This case involved
the sexual assault of a mentally handicapped student by a fellow student
who was in legal custody of the State of Arkansas.1 26 After rejecting an
argument that the State owed a duty to provide protection based on some
notion of functional custody, 127 the court turned to the state-created-
danger theory of liability. 2 ' The plaintiff argued that the state defend-
ants' act of placing a youth with known violent propensities in the same
program with the plaintiff created the risk of harm to which the plaintiff
was exposed.
129
The court refused to hold that the defendants' acts put the plaintiff
in harm's way and thus gave rise to a duty to protect, where the attack
took place at least two years after the violent youth had been placed in
the program. 130 The court observed that "[i]n most every circuit court
decision imposing § 1983 liability because the State affirmatively created
or enhanced a danger, 'the immediate threat of harm has a limited range
and duration,' unlike the indefinite risk created by enrolling Louis C. in
124. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1374. The dissent in D.R. disagreed with the majority's conclusion
"that harm from sexual assault was not a foreseeable risk." Id. at 1378 (Sloviter, C.J.,
dissenting).
125. No. 92-2452, 1993 WL 406464 (8th Cir. Oct. 13, 1993).
126. Id. at *1. The youth who committed the assault and rape was a ward of the Arkansas
Department of Human Services. Id.
127. Id. at *2. The court concluded that "public schools are simply not analogous to pris-
ons and mental institutions." Id.
128. Id. at *2-3.
129. Id. at *3. A similar argument was made in Hunter v. Carbondale Area School Dis-
trict, 829 F. Supp. 714 (M.D. Pa. 1993). Plaintiffs argued that defendant school officials cre-
ated the danger to which decedent was exposed when they placed the decedent, a seventh-
grade special education student, in detention with older students who harbored animosity to-
ward the boy. Id. at 720. The older students chased and assaulted the decedent after the
detention period, pursuing him to a stream where he drowned. Id. at 716-17. Noting that the
state-created-danger theory "is viable in limited circumstances," the court found "nothing in
the record... that suggest[ed] that either Defendant encouraged, facilitated or authorized the
students to engage in the conduct which took place." Id. at 720-21.
130. Dorothy, 1993 WL 406464, at *3.
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public school." '131 Concluding that the consequence was too remote
from the challenged conduct, the court refused to translate what it
viewed as a traditional tort claim into a due process deprivation.132
The Supreme Court's decision in Collins v. City of Harker
Heights 133 does not preclude the imposition of constitutional liability on
state officials who deliberately place public employees in a dangerous sit-
uation without adequate protection. For example, in L. W v. Grubbs,1
3 4
the plaintiff, a registered nurse at a medium security prison for young
male offenders, was kidnapped and raped by an inmate who had been
assigned to work with her. 13 5 The plaintiff named as defendants her su-
pervisors at the institution and alleged that, contrary to assurances that
had been made, they selected a known violent sex offender to work alone
with her in the clinic, thus "intentionally placing her in a position of
known danger." 136 The district court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss for lack of a custodial context giving rise to a duty to protect and
the plaintiff appealed.3 7
In reversing the dismissal, the Ninth Circuit stated that it was a
mistake to read DeShaney as making "victim custody" a prerequisite to a
due process claim for failure to protect. 138 The court noted two distinct
exceptions to the general rule that the state has no affirmative duty to
protect persons from violence inflicted by private actors: (1) the "special
relationship" exception, stemming from a custodial relationship between
the state and the victim; and (2) the "danger creation" exception, stem-
ming from "affirmative conduct on the part of the state in placing the
plaintiff in danger." '139
The state-created-danger theory had been recognized by the Ninth
Circuit in Wood v. Ostrander,1" in which a third party had raped a wo-
man after a police officer arrested the driver of the car in which she was a
passenger, impounded the car, and left her alone in a high-crime area in
the early hours of the morning.141 Finding that the officer's actions had
affirmatively placed her in danger, the court found her allegations suffi-
131. Id. at *4 n.4 (quoting Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 1993)).
132. Id. at *3.
133. 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992).
134. 974 F.2d 119 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 2442 (1992).
135. Id. at 120.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 121.
139. Id.
140. 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990).
141. Id. at 586.
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cient to withstand scrutiny under DeShaney. 42 As in Wood, the court in
L. W. concluded that the defendants' conduct "created the danger to
which L.W. fell victim,"' 43 a danger "that would not otherwise have ex-
isted."'" The plaintiff's allegations that the defendants created the dan-
ger to which she was exposed, "and did so with a sufficiently culpable
mental state," were sufficient to state a substantive due process claim
under § 1983.145
The defendants in L. W. argued that the Supreme Court's decision in
Collins precluded a public employee from asserting a substantive due
process claim against her supervisors for failure to protect. 146 The Ninth
Circuit distinguished Collins, however, as a case in which the plaintiff
asserted no affirmative culpable acts by the defendant city.1 47 In holding
that the city had no affirmative duty under the Due Process Clause to
provide a safe work environment, the Supreme Court observed that the
plaintiff in Collins had not claimed that "his supervisor instructed him to
go into the sewer when the supervisor knew or should have known that
there was a significant risk that he would be injured." 148 The L. W. plain-
tiff, unlike Collins, asserted that her supervisors knowingly put her in a
position of danger and thus owed her a duty to provide protection.'
49
In Gregory v. City of Rogers,150 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, sitting en banc, was closely divided. The majority held that of-
ficers who arrested a designated driver owed no constitutional duty to
protect the driver's intoxicated passengers from the dangerous situation
created when the driver left the passengers in the vehicle, with the keys
and unattended, outside the police station.15 1 When one of the passen-
gers attempted to drive home, the vehicle became involved in a single-car
142. Id. at 589-90.
143. LW., 974 F.2d at 121.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 123.
146. Id. at 122.
147. LW , 974 F.2d at 122.
148. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1069 (1992).
149. Id. Other courts have recognized the viability of substantive due process claims as-
serted by public employees who have been subjected to known dangers by state officials. See,
e.g., Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 359 (11th Cir. 1989) (recognizing
substantive due process claim where plaintiff, town clerk, was abducted and held hostage by
work squad inmates who were assigned to work in town hall without adequate supervision),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1784 (1990); Swader v. Virginia, 743 F. Supp. 434, 444 (E.D. Va. 1990)
(holding prison employee whose daughter was raped and killed by prisoner could state sub-
stantive due process claim against officials who allowed prisoner serving life sentence for rape
to work unsupervised on prison property where plaintiff was required to live with her family).
150. 974 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1265 (1993).
151. Id. at 1011-12.
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accident in which one passenger was killed and the other was injured." 2
The court concluded that even if the officers were aware of the intoxi-
cated state of the passengers, there was no affirmative act on the part of
the defendants that placed the passengers in a position of danger."5 '
Rather, it was the act of the designated driver in leaving them in an
unattended car with keys that exposed the passengers to the danger
encountered. 154
The majority opinion disposed of the case on the grounds that the
defendants owed no duty in a noncustodial situation in which they had
not affirmatively created or enhanced the risk encountered by the vic-
tims.155 The situation would have been different had the officers arrested
the designated driver and left the passengers they knew to be intoxicated
in the vehicle at the place of arrest.15 6 This suggestion arguably makes
the opinion turn more on elements of causation and culpability than on
any distinction between acts of omission and commission.
In Reed v. Gardner, I 7 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
applied the state-created-danger theory in reversing the dismissal of a
case on the pleadings. 5 8 The complaint alleged that police officers vio-
lated the plaintiff's constitutional rights when they arrested the driver of
a car and left the vehicle with an intoxicated passenger who shortly
thereafter collided head-on with the plaintiff's vehicle, killing and injur-
ing members of the plaintiff's family.1 5 9 Assuming the truth of the well-
pleaded factual allegations in the motion to dismiss, the court held that
liability could be imposed on police officers who arrested a sober driver
and left a passenger they knew or should have known was intoxicated to
drive the vehicle, thereby creating the specific danger that the plaintiff
and his family encountered.)"
The court was quick to note that the defendants had a duty to pro-
tect only to the extent that their affirmative acts created or enhanced the
152. Id. at 1008.
153. Id. at 1011.
154. Id at 1012.
155. See id. at 1010-11.
156. Id. at 1011.
157. 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1993).
158. See id. at 1125.
159. Id. at 1123.
160. Id at 1125. On the face of the pleadings, there was no allegation that the driver was
arrested by the defendants because she was intoxicated, although this fact was made known to
the court by one of the defendants. Id at 1124. It appears that had the district court judge
converted the motion for a judgment on the pleadings into a summary judgment motion, this
fact outside the pleadings would have been legitimately considered and summary judgment for
the defendants would have been affirmed on the theory that removing a drunk driver and
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danger faced by the victims. 6 1 Had the officers arrested one drunk
driver and left the vehicle in the custody of another drunk driver or had
they observed and not interfered with the operation of a vehicle by a
driver they knew to be intoxicated, no constitutional liability would have
attached. 62 In either of these situations, the police would have done
nothing to "place individuals in a position of danger that otherwise they
would not have faced."1 6 ' The court's reasoning in Reed underscores the
confusion engendered by any theory that turns "on the tenuous meta-
physical construct which differentiates sins of omission and commis-
sion." 164 From a common sense viewpoint, it is difficult to fathom why
officers who knowingly allow an intoxicated person to drive off in a vehi-
cle should be in constitutionally different positions depending upon
whether they arrested a sober driver, leaving the drunk driver in control
of the vehicle; arrested a drunk driver, leaving another drunk driver in
control of the vehicle; or simply stood by and watched while someone
they knew was intoxicated took control of the vehicle. Rather than fo-
cusing upon the affirmative nature of the conduct involved, the courts
should ask whether the defendant's acts or omissions were the cause of
the plaintiff's injuries and, if so, whether such acts or omissions reflect
the requisite level of culpability to constitute a constitutional violation.
B. Enhancement-of-Risk Cases
In Sinthasomphone v. City of Milwaukee, 6 ' three police officers re-
sponded to a call for help from two women who observed a young, na-
ked, bleeding male wandering in the street.166 The officers took control
of the situation, declined assistance from others who were willing and
able to provide it, and released the young man into the custody of a Mr.
Jeffrey Dahmer who shortly thereafter added the fourteen-year-old Lao-
failing to prevent her replacement with another intoxicated individual did not create or en-
hance the risk faced by the individuals involved. Id. at 1124, 1127.
Judge Posner would not have addressed "the difficult constitutional question" of whether
a due process claim could be stated if the driver arrested by the defendants had been sober. Id.
at 1128 (Posner, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). He would have remanded to
allow the district court to conduct a summary judgment proceeding, which in light of the facts
introduced, would have put an end to the case without the need to resolve the constitutional
issue. Id. at 1128-29 (Posner, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
161. Id at 1126.
162. Id. at 1125.
163. Id
164. White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 384 (7th Cir. 1979).
165. 785 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D. Wis. 1992).
166. Id at 1346.
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tian boy's name to the long list of his other unfortunate victims. 167 The
plaintiffs and the estate and family of the victim brought a § 1983 action
against the officers and the City of Milwaukee, asserting that the defend-
ants' failure to protect him violated the victim's constitutional rights.
1 68
The court noted both the legal difficulties posed by this case, as well
as the "genius" of the complaint in trying to avoid those difficulties.
169
In denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, the court concluded that a
key distinction between this case and DeShaney rested in the line be-
tween action and inaction. "[P]laintiffs have not merely alleged that the
police officers failed to protect [the boy] .... Rather, they allege[d]...
that the officers actively prevented private citizens from helping [him]
.... [T]he allegations are not just of police inaction, but of police action
.*... "7o Thus, although the officers did not create the danger that befell
Sinthasomphone, their interference with aid that would otherwise have
been forthcoming significantly increased the risk of harm to which he
was subjected. 171
In Pinder v. Commissioners of Cambridge,72 the plaintiff's boy-
friend had been taken into custody after physically attacking and threat-
ening to kill the plaintiff and her children.1 7 1 The plaintiff informed the
167. Id. at 1345-46. For a popular-media account of this tragedy, see, for example, Police
May Have Left Boy with Slaying Suspect, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 1991, at A2.
168. Sinthasomphone, 785 F.Supp. at 1346-46.
169. Id. at 1347.
170. Id at 1349. Sinthasomphone is a good example of a case in which the plaintiffs relied
on a number of different theories in an attempt to slip through the "cracks" in the surface of
DeShaney. Although the action/inaction distinction would have been sufficient to sustain the
complaint at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court noted other allegations in the complaint
that served to differentiate the case from DeShaney. Id The allegations supported a claim
that the boy was taken into "brief police custody," and released to an unrelated adult with no
legal right to custody. Id In addition, the court found that the complaint clearly stated a
claim that the officers' conduct and the policy of the city operated to deny Sinthasomphone
equal protection under the law. Id at 1350. Plaintiffs alleged that it was the policy of the city
to differentiate in the provision of protective services on the "basis of race, color, national
origin, or sexual orientation." Id
171. See also Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d 1422, 1431 (7th Cir. 1990) (allowing claim
stated under § 1983 -where plaintiff alleged that her son's death was due to county's policy of
preventing private assistance to drowning victims and failing to provide effective replacement
protection), distinguished in Andrews v. Wilkins, 934 F.2d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting,
whereas deputy in Ross used his authority as state actor to intrude into purely private rescue
effort, police in Andrews enlisted private assistance as part of ongoing police rescue effort); cf
Rogers v. City of Port Huron, No. 92-CV-75898-DT, 1993 WL 409729, at *6-8 (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 5, 1993) (deciding "plaintiffs cannot establish that Officers ... violated a clear constitu-
tional right in preventing private citizens from rescuing Decedent in light of conflicting opin-
ions within the circuits addressing this issue").
172. 821 F. Supp. 376 (D. Md. 1993).
173. Id
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arresting officer that the boyfriend was on probation for a previous arson
conviction relating to the plaintiff's home and expressed concern about
returning to work and leaving her children at home.174 The plaintiff re-
turned to work when she was assured that the boyfriend would be kept in
custody. 175 The boyfriend was released on his own recognizance after
spending only one hour in custody. 176 He went directly to plaintiff's
home and set a fire that killed her three children.
177
The plaintiff sued individually and on behalf of her minor children,
claiming that the arresting officer and the City of Cambridge had vio-
lated her constitutional rights by not providing protection in these tragic
circumstances.1 78 The court made the following observation:
The Deshaney Court . .. left two issues unresolved. First,
whether, after Deshaney, there are any noncustodial circum-
stances in which the state's enhancement of the risk of injury to
a plaintiff violates the Due Process Clause. Second, assuming
that such circumstances exist, how large a role the state must
play in the creation or enhancement of the danger before it as-
sumes a corresponding constitutional duty to protect.
179
The court first concluded that DeShaney did not confine the sub-






179. Id. at 388.
180. IM The court noted Fourth Circuit pre-DeShaney precedent that had recognized an
affirmative duty to protect in noncustodial situations, see Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 190-
94 (4th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985), as well as the many post-DeShaney
decisions that recognize an affirmative duty in a noncustodial setting, see Pinder, 821 F. Supp.
at 388-90. See also Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 1993) (determining "plain-
tiffs ... may state claims for civil rights violations if they allege state action that creates, or
substantially contributes to the creation of, a danger or renders citizens more vulnerable to a
danger that [sic] they otherwise would have been"); Dwares v. City of N.Y., 985 F.2d 94, 99
(2d Cir. 1993) (finding DeShaney not controlling where plaintiff alleged defendant officers con-
spired to make demonstrators more vulnerable to assaults by skinheads); L.W. v. Grubbs, 974
F.2d 119, 120-21 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding plaintiff stated constitutional claim against defend-
ant correctional officers where defendants intentionally assigned known violent sex offender to
work alone with plaintiff in clinic), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2442 (1993); Losinski v. County of
Trempealeau, 946 F.2d 544, 551 (7th Cir. 1991) (recognizing "Etihe essence of the Court's
exception in DeShaney is state creation of dangers faced or involuntary subjection to known
risks"); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990) (DeShaney analysis "establishes
the possibility that a constitutional duty to protect an individual against private violence may
exist in a non-custodial setting if the state has taken affirmative action which increases the
individual's danger of, or vulnerability to, such violence beyond the level it would have been at
absent state action"); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1521 n.19 (7th Cir. 1990)
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that "while the custodial circumstances of a plaintiff are important, they
are not dispositive." 18 1  Addressing the problem of the "slippery
slope," '182 the court pointed to three specific standards that operate to
limit liability and make a "mechanical application of substantive due
process to custodial settings" unnecessary.
1 83
First, government is under no duty to provide citizens with any
services at all.1 84 The substantive due process right to protection in a
noncustodial context should not impact upon the discretion that would
otherwise operate in public resource allocation.8 ' Second, the court
noted that the plaintiff's burden to prove a high level of culpability and
to demonstrate that the state's conduct was the proximate cause of her
injury 86 would protect government officials from unwarranted liabil-
ity. 187 Finally, the court suggested that even if a plaintiff successfully
satisfied the rigorous culpability and causation demands imposed in the
substantive due process context, a difficult barrier might still exist if the
(concluding DeShaney not controlling when city alleged to have played part in both creating
danger and rendering public more vulnerable to danger); Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d 1422,
1431 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding plaintiff stated cognizable claim under § 1983 when she alleged
that her son was deprived of life due to county policy prohibiting private rescue efforts to aid
drowning victims without effective replacement protection); Cornelius v. Town of Highland
Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 359 (11th Cir. 1989) (concluding defendants owed plaintiff duty of protec-
tion when they placed her in unique position of danger by exposing her to inmates who were
inadequately supervised), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d
583, 590 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding police had affirmative duty to protect plaintiff after arresting
driver of car in which plaintiff was passenger, impounding vehicle, and leaving plaintiff
stranded in high-crime area), cert denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990); Was v. Young, 796 F. Supp.
1041, 1048 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (noting "some lower federal courts have held the state accounta-
ble for a victim's injuries even though the victim was not in state custody, where the state has
created a danger to the victim"); G-69 v. Degnan, 745 F. Supp. 254, 265 (D.N.J. 1990) (finding
affirmative duty to protect informant to whom state had made guarantees of personal safety);
Swader v. Virginia, 743 F. Supp. 434, 444 (E.D. Va. 1990) (finding affirmative duty where
defendants required prison employees and their families to live on prison property where in-
mates were allowed to work). But see Ying Jing Gan V. City of N.Y., 996 F.2d 522, 534-35
(2d Cir. 1993) (finding complainant who agreed to identify suspects was owed no duty of
protection by city).
181. Pinder, 821 F. Supp. at 390.
182. Professors Eaton and Wells aptly criticize slippery-slope arguments in the context of
recognizing affirmative duties, pointing out that a "well defined body of case law" in this area
"provides guideposts sufficiently determinate to avoid such horribles as the constitutionalizing
of basic government services." Eaton & Wells, supra note 11, at 132-33.
183. Pinder, 821 F. Supp. at 391.
184. Id, (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980), and finding no obligation to
fund abortions or other medical services).
185. Id
186. Id. at 392 (citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980), and finding nexus
between plaintiff's injury and state's conduct too attenuated to state constitutional claim).
187. Id.
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defendant raised a qualified immunity defense. 88 Plaintiff would have to
show that the "contours" of the substantive due process right to protec-
tion claimed in the case were clearly established at the time of the chal-
lenged action."8 9 Thus, the court outlined the safeguards that were
already in place to restrict the scope of liability for any breach of a sub-
stantive due process duty to provide protection in a noncustodial context.
Next, the court tackled the tougher question of whether the behav-
ior by the state created a duty "such that the corresponding failure to act
[was] arbitrary."' 90 The court then drew from the common-law distinc-
tion between "misfeasance" and "nonfeasance" to "clarify the amount of
governmental intervention necessary to create an affirmative duty for
governmental action."' 91 The state thus assumes an affirmative duty to
188. Id While a qualified immunity defense is available to government officials sued in
their individual capacities, the Supreme Court has held that a local government entity has no
qualified immunity from compensatory damages liability under § 1983. Owen v. City of Inde-
pendence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980). Therefore, in cases where governmental and individual
liability are asserted, summary judgment for the individual defendant on qualified immunity
grounds will not necessarily dispose of the claim against the government entity. See, e.g., Doe
v. Sullivan County, 956 F.2d 545, 554 (6th Cir.) (noting municipality is not immune from
liability simply because officer was entitled to qualified immunity), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 187
(1992); Munz v. Ryan, 752 F. Supp. 1537, 1551 (D. Kan. 1990) (concluding it was not incon-
sistent to find official entitled to qualified immunity while holding municipality liable for his
constitutional violations if caused by final policy maker).
Although local governments are not entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983, the
court, in Watson v. Sexton, 755 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), dismissed the plaintiff's claim
against the City Department of Sanitation for failure to train its employees in proper adminis-
tration of a substance abuse policy, when individual defendants had prevailed on qualified
immunity grounds, id at 592. The court held that
Etlo be "deliberately indifferent" to rights requires that those rights be clearly estab-
lished. Therefore, even if plaintiff could prove that her Fourth Amendment rights
were violated by current standards because the City inadequately trained its employ-
ees, plaintiff cannot show that the City was deliberately indifferent to rights that were
not clearly established [at the time the challenged actions were taken].
Id at 588; see also Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 783 (10th Cir. 1993) (observing
that when finding of qualified immunity is based on determination that individual officer's
conduct did not violate law, such finding may preclude imposition of municipal liability); Bar-
ber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232, 240 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding "where no constitutional
violation exists for failure to take special precautions, none exists for failure to promulgate
policies and to better train personnel to detect and deter jail suicides"); Williamson v. City of
Va. Beach, 786 F. Supp. 1238, 1264-65 (E.D. Va. 1992) ("Assuming that the constitutional
rights alleged by plaintiff did exist, the conclusion that they were not clearly established ne-
gates the proposition that the city acted with deliberate indifference."), aff'd, 991 F.2d 793
(4th Cir. 1993).
189. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (holding "[t]he contours of the
right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right").
190. Pinder, 821 F. Supp. at 394.
191. Id at 394-95.
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protect in a noncustodial setting only when it creates or enhances the
danger encountered by the plaintiff.192
In assessing the facts pleaded by the plaintiff, the court found that
the alleged assurances that the defendants gave to the plaintiff that the
danger had been removed "turned their nonliable nonfeasance into liable
misfeasance."' 193 In reliance on the officer's assurances, Ms. Pinder re-
turned to work, making her children more vulnerable to the harm caused
by her former boyfriend. 194 The court concluded that the officer's con-
duct increased the risk confronted by the plaintiff and deprived her and
her children of help that would otherwise have been available.' 95
It is interesting to compare Pinder with Losinski v. County of Trem-
pealeau.196 Losinski, like Pinder, was a case of domestic violence. Julie
Losinski and her three children fled their trailer home after a particularly
violent domestic dispute with her husband.197 Ms. Losinski successfully
obtained a "no contact" temporary restraining order and shortly thereaf-
ter commenced divorce proceedings.19 8 She was granted permission to
return to the trailer to retrieve some personal belongings. 199 Given her
husband's violent nature and the presence of guns in the home, Ms. Lo-
sinski sought and was granted police protection for this purpose.200 Ms.
Losinski, accompanied by her mother, brother-in-law, and Deputy
Hovell, proceeded to the trailer home where her husband confronted
them and expressed his desire to speak with her alone.20' She apparently
consented to this wish and was allowed to enter the home with her hus-
band.2" 2 When it became clear that an argument had erupted inside the
192. Id. at 395.
193. Id at 396.
194. Id
195. Id. A neighbor of Ms. Pinder had been restraining the boyfriend until the officer ar-
rived on the scene. Id at 397. The court was of the opinion that had Ms. Pinder known that
her attacker would not remain in custody, she would have enlisted further assistance from the
neighbor or stayed at home herself. Id
The court also noted that "if [the officer's] decision to charge [the plaintiff's boyfriend]
with relatively minor offenses was influenced by a personal relationship, this claim may be
actionable as well." Id; see also Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing substantive due process claim stated when, due to chief of police's personal relationship
with abusive husband, police protection that would otherwise have been forthcoming was
withheld, resulting in murder of plaintiff and her daughter).
196. 946 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1991).
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trailer, the others entered the trailer.2 °3 There was no attempt on the
part of Deputy Hovell to end the dispute or separate Ms. Losinski from
her husband.2° The argument continued in the bedroom and, as Deputy
Hovell and the others stood in an adjacent hallway, the husband shot
Ms. Losinski in the head and neck.205 She died three days later. 6
Ms. Losinski's three children and her estate brought an action
against the county, the sheriff, Deputy Hovell, and their insurers, assert-
ing both constitutional and state-law claims.2°7 The complaint alleged
that, by agreeing to provide protection to Ms. Losinski, the defendants
created a special relationship that survived DeShaney analysis and that
the failure to protect in this situation violated Ms. Losinski's rights under
the Due Process Clause.20 8
In addressing the plaintiffs' due process claim, the court first re-
jected an argument that Ms. Losinski was owed an affirmative duty be-
cause she was in the "protective custody" of the state when harm befell
her.209 Adhering to a notion of custody characterized by restraint and
involuntariness, the court quickly concluded that Ms. Losinski had been
under no coercion to accept the state's protection.210 With no coercion
or restraint, the fact that the state had assumed some responsibility for
her safety was insufficient to satisfy the "in custody" requirement of
DeShaney.2 "
The court found the plaintiffs' other argument more plausible: By
offering protection to Ms. Losinski and assuming some responsibility for
her welfare, the defendants created or increased the risk of harm to
which she was exposed, and thus owed her an affirmative duty to render
assistance.212 Ultimately, however, the court rejected the constitutional
claim as precluded by DeShaney, concluding that "[w]hile the issue [was]
very close,.., the essence.., of DeShaney is state creation of dangers
203. IM. at 547-48.
204. Id at 548.
205. Id
206. Id. at 547-48.
207. Id at 548.
208. Id
209. Id at 550.
210. Id.
211. The court did make the following observation:
The DeShaney vision of the substantive component of the due process clause has
been debated from many perspectives. The vision of the state as wholly distinct from
the individual, assuming indubitable obligations only when the state goes so far as to
take the citizen into some form of custody is difficult to relate to the complex web of
dependencies that characterize the modem state.
Id at 551.
212. Id. at 550.
[Vol. 27:435
INTERPRETING DESHANEY
faced or involuntary subjection to known risks." '213 The court held
neither element was satisfied in Losinski.21 4 The defendants had not cre-
ated or enhanced the risk facing Ms. Losinski, nor did they subject her
involuntarily to a known existing danger.215 While recognizing that Ms.
Losinski may not have gone to the trailer home had she not been accom-
panied by Deputy Hovell, the court explained that "[a]lthough the state
walked with Julie as she approached the 'lion's den,' it did not force her
to proceed.
2 16
The lower courts are obviously struggling to formulate a coherent
theory for applying the "in custody" and "state-created danger" excep-
tions to DeShaney's no-affirmative-duty rule. A review of recent cases
reveals the fine lines and distinctions courts are drawing. The compari-
son of Gregory and Reed, along with the examination of Pinder and Lo-
sinski, forces one to ask whether constitutional doctrine should be built
on such parsing of facts. Characterizations about the custodial or non-
custodial context of the case and, if noncustodial, whether defendants
have committed sins of omission or commission, may determine not only
whether a duty to protect exists at all, but also what level of culpability
will be required in order to state a claim under the Due Process Clause.
IV. THE CULPABILITY FACTOR
The Supreme Court has not definitively established the level of cul-
pability that is required to make out a substantive due process claim
based on a failure to protect, but has held that something more than
"mere negligence" must be shown.2 17 Indeed, in Collins v. City of
Harker Heights21 8 the Court implied that allegations of deliberate con-
duct that "shocks the conscience ' 219 might be required to state a sub-
stantive due process claim.22 0 Multiple standards, including gross
213. Id. at 550-51.
214. Id. at 550.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 550-51.
217. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333
(1986). In City of Canton v. Harris, 498 U.S. 378 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff could make out a claim under § 1983 for injuries resulting from a municipality's fail-
ure to train police officers "only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to
the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact," id. at 388 (footnote omitted).
218. 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992).
219. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding substantive due process claim
stated where pumping of criminal defendant's stomach to obtain evidence was determined to
be "conduct that shocks the conscience").
220. Collins, 112 S. Ct. at 1071 (refusing to find city's alleged deliberate indifference to
worker's safety was "arbitrary Government action that must 'shock the conscience' of federal
judges"). In Searles v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 990 F.2d 789 (3d
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negligence, 22 1 recklessness, 22 2 deliberate indifference, 223 and conscience-
shocking conduct, 224 have been articulated by the lower federal courts. 225
In Fagan v. City of Vineland,226 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit addressed the issue of the level of culpability required to state a
substantive due process claim in the context of a high-speed police pur-
suit that resulted in the deaths of three innocent bystanders. 227 The inci-
dent that initially gave rise to the chase was the protrusion of a passenger
waving his arms through a car's open rooftop.228 When the driver of the
vehicle failed to stop in response to an officer's activated overhead lights,
a chase began and continued through residential neighborhoods. 229
Other police vehicles became involved in the pursuit, which ended tragi-
Cir. 1993), the court noted that the concepts of deliberate indifference and deliberate harm are
quite distinct, the latter requiring an "intent to injure," id. at 793.
221. See, eg., Simescu v. Emmet County Dep't of Social Servs., 942 F.2d 372, 375 (6th Cir.
1991) (holding gross negligence sufficient for substantive due process claim, where gross negli-
gence is described as defendant "'intentionally do[ing] something unreasonable with disregard
to a known risk or a risk so obvious that he must be assumed to have been aware of it, and of a
magnitude such that it is highly probable that harm will follow'" (quoting Nishiyama v. Dick-
son County, 814 F.2d 277, 282 (6th Cir. 1987)). As the Third Circuit has pointed out, this
concept of gross negligence "closely resembles reckless indifference." Fagan v. City of Vine-
land, 1993 WL 290386, at *12 (3d Cir. Aug. 5, 1993), vacated, Nos. 92-5481, 92-5482, 92-
5551, 92-5594, 1993 WL 335370 (3d Cir. Sept. 2, 1993) (en banc); accord Dell Fargo v. City of
San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638, 640 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding gross negligence or reckless-
ness sufficient to state due process claim).
222. See, e.g., Fagan, 1993 WL 290386, at *1 (holding standard of liability under Due
Process Clause in police chase case is "whether the defendant police officers acted with reckless
indifference to public safety"); Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating
reckless or callous indifference is required for substantive due process violation).
223. See, e.g., Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing deliberate indifference is level of culpability that pretrial detainees must establish for viola-
tion of their personal security interests under Fourteenth Amendment), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
972 (1992); Salazar v. City of Chicago, 940 F.2d 233, 238-39 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding deliber-
ate indifference proper standard for substantive due process claim but also noting that it is
synonymous with intentional or criminally reckless conduct).
224. See, eg., Frohmader v. Wayne, 958 F.2d 1024, 1027 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that in
excessive force case "[tihe due process standard is more onerous than the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard since the former requires, in addition to undue force, personal malice
amounting to an abuse of official power sufficient to shock the conscience"); Temkin v. Freder-
ick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 720-21 (4th Cir. 1991) (adopting shocks-the-conscience
standard for substantive due process claims arising out of police pursuit), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1172 (1992).
225. See Barbara Kritchevsky, Making Sense of State of Mind: Determining Responsibility
in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Litigation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 417 (1992), where the
author observes that "there appears to be no discernible difference between indifference, reck-
lessness, wantonness, and willfulness," id at 470 n.279.
226. Fagan, 1993 WL 290386, at *1.
227. Id. at *1.
228. Id. at *2.
229. Id.
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cally when the pursued vehicle ran a red light and collided with a pickup
truck, killing both occupants of the truck as well as one of the passengers
in the fleeing vehicle.230
The plaintiffs, the accident survivors, and the estates and relatives of
those killed, brought actions under § 1983 against the officers and the
city. They alleged that their substantive due process rights were violated
by the officers' recklessness and by the city's failure to train the officers
properly regarding high-speed pursuits.23 1 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the constitutional
claims, holding that the alleged conduct of the officers could not be found
to satisfy the applicable standard in this context.232 A jury could not find
that the actions of the officers constituted "[b]ehavior that shocks the
conscience, ... outrageous behavior, or behavior that offends a sense of
justice.
233
230. IM at *2-3.
231. Id. at *1.
232. Id. at *8.
233. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 804 F. Supp. 591, 603 (D.N.J. 1992) (footnote omitted),
rev'd, 1993 WL 290386, at *14-17 (3d Cir. Aug. 5, 1993), vacated, Nos. 92-5481, 92-5482, 92-
5551, 92-5594, 1993 WL 335370 (3d Cir. Sept. 2, 1993) (en banc). Having found no underly-
ing constitutional violation, the court concluded there could be no liability on the part of the
City for failure to train. Id at 606 (citing City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)).
The Third Circuit held, however, that the city could be found independently liable for the
violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights even if the individual officers were found not liable
because they lacked the requisite mental state to be constitutionally accountable. Fagan, 1993
WL 290386, at *14-17; accord Parrish v. Luckie, 963 F.2d 201, 207 (8th Cir. 1992) (recogniz-
ing "[a] public entity or supervisory official may be liable under § 1983, even though no gov-
ernment individuals were personally liable"); Simmons v. City of Phila., 947 F.2d 1042, 1058-
65 (3d Cir. 1991) (no inconsistency in jury's determination that police officer's actions did not
amount to constitutional violation, while city was found liable under § 1983 on theory of pol-
icy of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of intoxicated and potentially suicidal
detainees and failure to train officers to detect and meet such needs), cert denied, 112 S. Ct.
1671 (1992); Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495-96 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding sheriff liable
in official capacity for failure to train officers regarding identification techniques and failure to
properly account for incarcerated suspects, while deputies' actions which flowed from lack of
procedures were deemed mere negligence); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1519-20
(7th Cir. 1990) (determining that dismissal of claim against officer on grounds that he did not
act under color of state law was not dispositive of claim against city where allegations of
municipal policy of allowing mentally unfit officers to retain service revolvers); Fulkerson v.
City of Lancaster, 801 F. Supp. 1476, 1485 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (acknowledging in high-speed
pursuit context that "[i]n this case, as in Simmons, the individual police officer named as a
defendant could be a causal conduit for the constitutional violation, without committing such
a violation himself"), aff'd, 993 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1993).
For an extensive and fascinating analysis of the problems caused by lower courts' reliance
on Heller to justify bifurcation in cases alleging both individual and municipal liability, see
Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police
Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499 (1993).
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In reversing the part of the district court's decision that held that a
shocks-the-conscience standard was applicable to the due process claim
asserted, the majority of the circuit panel held that "the standard of lia-
bility under section 1983 for a substantive due process violation in a po-
lice pursuit case is whether a pursuing police officer acted with a reckless
indifference to public safety. '2 34 The court made clear that its holding
did not rest on the premise that a special relationship existed between the
officers involved in the pursuit and the innocent bystanders: The officers
did not have an affirmative duty to protect those bystanders from injury
at the hands of private actors.235 Although no special relationship theory
could serve as the basis for implying an affirmative duty to protect, the
court observed that the case was different from DeShaney because "the
police actively created the danger that resulted in the plaintiffs' inju-
ries."' 236 Thus, where the officers had affirmatively placed the victims in
harm's way, a duty to protect existed. The issue was then the standard of
culpability that would be applied to decide whether the duty had been
breached.
The majority in Fagan focused on the affirmative acts of the officers
not only for the purpose of finding a duty owed to the victims, but also
for the purpose of deciding what level of culpability would be required to
establish a breach.237 The court distinguished the police pursuit context
from those noncustodial situations where persons were injured because of
the failure of the state to take action to rectify or eliminate a known
risk.238 It concluded that the standard of liability applied in custody
234. Fagan, 1993 WL 290386, at *12. The court went on to explain that
[tihis standard does not require that the defendant intended to cause harm. Instead,
the defendant acts with reckless indifference if he was aware of a known or obvious
risk that was so great that it was highly probable that serious harm would follow, and
he proceeded in conscious and unreasonable disregard of the consequences.
Ia
235. Id at *28 n.5.
236. Id
237. Id at *11.
238. Id at *10. The court explained that "[iun both Collins and Searles, the government
did not directly cause harm to the plaintiffs but instead failed to take action to eliminate dan-
gerous conditions." Id In Searles v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,
990 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1993), the plaintiff's husband was killed when a motor fell from a
moving railcar and hit a switch, causing the car decedent was riding in to derail and strike a
pillar, i d at 790. The Third Circuit, in rejecting plaintiff's due process claims, found the case
to be analogous to Collins and concluded that "the alleged conduct of defendants in [Searles] is
no more shocking than the conduct alleged in Collins." Id. at 792-93.
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cases involving substantive due process claims, that of reckless indiffer-
ence, should likewise apply in police pursuit cases.239
Chief Judge Sloviter, in dissent, took the position that the Supreme
Court's opinion in Collins mandated a reexamination of the "routine in-
vocation" of the reckless indifference standard in substantive due process
cases. She concluded that only conduct so abusive of official power that
it shocks the conscience can violate the Due Process Clause. 2" Citing
numerous cases in support of her position that the shocks-the-conscience
standard has been applied to affirmative acts of government, Chief Judge
Sloviter rejected the majority's limitation of the standard to situations
where government officials' liability is based on a failure to act.241
Under the dissent's approach, while the substantive due process
analysis would entail a uniform, although "amorphous and imprecise in-
quiry, '  as to whether the alleged conduct shocks the conscience, the
answer would depend on several factors: the defendant's state of mind,
the "responsibilities of a particular official[,] ... his power to take certain
actions,"243 and "the nature and types of discretion which different gov-
ernment officials must be allowed to exercise if they are to have the free-
dom to carry out their duties without undue interference." 2' Thus,
what shocks the conscience will be a function of both the context in
which the conduct occurs and the responsibilities of the officials charged
with violating the Constitution.
The shocks-the-conscience test would be satisfied by a government
actor's recklessness or deliberate indifference to the basic needs of those
who are in the state's custody.245 Furthermore, where a governmental
entity is shown to have failed to train its officers in exercising the power
vested in them, and such failure is deliberately indifferent to the constitu-
tional rights of persons with whom those officers come into contact, the
failure to train may shock the conscience.246 In noncustodial contexts
239. Fagan, 1993 WL 290386, at *12-13. The majority of the panel expressly disagreed that
someone in the custody of the state should be entitled to a more deferential standard of liability
than someone who is the innocent victim of a high-speed pursuit. Id at *13.
240. Id. at *21 (Sloviter, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
241. Id. at *23 (Sloviter, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing cases).
242. Id. at *26 (Sloviter, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
243. Id. at *25 (Sloviter, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
244. Id. (Sloviter, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
245. Id. at *28 (Sloviter, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
246. Id. (Sloviter, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, given the facts in
Fagan, Chief Judge Sloviter found the conduct of the individual officers not so egregious as to
shock the conscience of the court, yet would entertain a substantive due process claim against
the city based on a failure to train in proper police pursuit procedures, where such failure was
likely to result in constitutional violations. Id. at *26-27. The deliberate indifference of the
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involving individual state actors' liability, however, it would take more
than reckless or deliberate indifference to shock the conscience, whether
the conduct was characterized as an affirmative act or an omission.247
There is certainly precedent for applying different standards of cul-
pability to the same constitutional provision. This depends upon the
context in which the alleged offense occurs and the nature of the claim
being asserted. In the Eighth Amendment context, for example, prison
conditions cases and medical needs cases are governed by a "deliberate
indifference" standard,24 while excessive force claims must satisfy a
"malicious and sadistic" standard of culpability.24 9 The ultimate ques-
city to the great likelihood that constitutional rights would be violated would "necessarily"
shock the conscience. Id. at *28. In defending the notion that different standards of culpabil-
ity should apply to the liability of a governmental entity and its employees, Chief Judge
Sloviter reasoned that:
[a] governmental entity that places its employees in positions of authority where they
act under color of state law, i.e. with uniforms, badges, firearms, and marked police
cars, necessarily has the correlative obligation to take all reasonable steps to assure
that those employees are appropriately trained so that the individual officers will not
misuse their state-given power.
Id.
247. The dissent implies that allegations of a deliberate, willful violation of one's constitu-
tional rights by the defendants would suffice to state a due process claim. Id. at *28 n.5 (not-
ing significance in Fagan, as in Collins, that "plaintiffs have not alleged deliberate action").
The allegations set forth by plaintiffs in Boyle v. City of Liberty, No. 92-087-CV-W-6,
1993 WL 398870 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 6, 1993), might reflect the heightened level of culpability
that Chief Judge Sloviter would demand in a high-speed pursuit situation. Plaintiffs in Boyle
alleged that police officers set up a roadblock during morning "rush hour," causing a mile-long
line of traffic in both lanes. The officers did this deliberately to effect the seizure of a minor
child and an adult companion who had stolen a car and were being pursued by other officers at
speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour. As a result, "[t]he stolen car drove between the two lines
of traffic ... and collided with various cars, killing one civilian, causing substantial property
damage and personal injury to others." Id. at *1. Based on plaintiffs' allegations that the
defendants "intentionally placed [plaintiffs] in a position where personal injury was not merely
possible but inevitable," the court concluded that plaintiffs had adequately pled both a duty to
protect and a breach of that duty. Id. at *11. The scope of the duty and the reasonableness of
the conduct would remain to be resolved by summary judgment or trial. Id.
248. See, eg., Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2481 (1993) (recognizing claim under
Eighth Amendment based on prison officials' deliberate indifference to exposure of prisoner to
levels of environmental tobacco smoke "that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to
his future health"); Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326-27 (1991) (making deliberate indif-
ference standard of Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), applicable to all complaints about
conditions of confinement); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (holding Eighth
Amendment violated by deliberate indifference to prisoners' serious medical needs).
249. Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 998-99 (1992) (adopting standard established in
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), where force was used in context of prison riot, and
making fWhitley standard applicable "whenever prison officials stand accused of using exces-
sive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, [making] the
core judicial inquiry.., whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm").
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tion in both contexts is whether the alleged conduct or condition consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment.25 °
Likewise, in the substantive due process context, there is precedent
for applying different standards of culpability depending upon the nature
of the claim, the setting in which it arose, and the responsibilities of the
state actors involved. In Youngberg v. Romeo,251 a case involving the
treatment of involuntarily committed, mentally retarded patients, the
Supreme Court held that liability could be imposed "when the decision
by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted profes-
sional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person
responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment." '252
In Shaw v. Strackhouse,253 a profoundly retarded resident of a state
mental institution brought a § 1983 action against state employees, as-
serting a failure to protect him from abuse and sexual assault.254 On
appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the
Third Circuit addressed the standard of care that state officials owe to
those in their custody, and determined that the standard might vary de-
pending upon the nature of the physical custody involved.255
The court concluded that while a deliberate indifference standard
governed the liability of the nonprofessional employee-defendants, "the
Youngberg professional judgment standard should have been applied to
the primary care professionals, supervisors and administrators named as
defendants. '256 In the court's opinion, professional judgment is a rela-
tively deferential standard that, like recklessness and gross negligence,
would fall "somewhere between simple negligence and intentional mis-
conduct. ' 2 7 The plaintiff's burden is somewhat greater "when trying to
establish deliberate indifference than when trying to establish a failure to
exercise professional judgment.
'258
A number of courts have applied the professional judgment stan-
dard to substantive due process claims raised by involuntarily placed fos-
ter children. In Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Department of Human
Services,259 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit expressed some
250. Id. at 1000.
251. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
252. Id. at 323.
253. 920 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1990).
254. Id. at 1138-39.
255. Id. at 1144.
256. Id. at 1139.
257. Id. at 1146.
258. Id. at 1150.
259. 959 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1992).
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doubt about any significant difference between the two standards in the
context of foster care, yet adopted the professional judgment standard
rather than deliberate indifference.260 The court explained:
The compelling appeal of the argument for the professional
judgment standard is that foster children, like involuntarily
committed patients, are "entitled to more considerate treat-
ment and conditions" than criminals. These are young chil-
dren, taken by the state from their .parents for reasons that
generally are not the fault of the children themselves. "The of-
ficials who place the children are acting in place of the
parents.
26 1
The District Court for the District of Columbia has also held that it
would be "inappropriate" to require children in foster care to demon-
strate deliberate indifference on the part of their caretakers in order to
make out a constitutional claim for relief under the Due Process
Clause.2 62 The court concluded that it would "judge the defendants' lia-
bility based on whether they have exercised competent professional judg-
ment in the administration of the District's child welfare system.
263
V. CONCLUSION
Given the variety and range of situations that may be covered by an
affirmative duty theory under the Due Process Clause, it is not surprising
that the lower court opinions in this area reflect a sense of confusion and
a need for guidelines and principles beyond the foundation poured in
260. d. at 894. In adopting the professional judgment standard in the foster care situation,
the Tenth Circuit expressed agreement with the approach of the Seventh Circuit in K.H. v.
Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 854 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding "[o]nly if without justification based either
on financial constraints or on considerations of professional judgment [state welfare workers
and their supervisors] place the child in hands they know to be dangerous or otherwise unfit do
they expose themselves to liability in damages"). See also Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't of
Human Serv., 959 F.2d 883, 893-94 (10th Cir. 1992); Baby Neal v. Casey, 821 F. Supp. 320,
340 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (determining proper standard to be applied to substantive due process
claims of involuntarily committed foster children is professional judgment standard). But see
Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding child in foster care
may prevail under § 1983 "only where it is alleged and the proof shows that the state officials
were deliberately indifferent to the welfare of the child"), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
261. Yvonne L, 959 F.2d at 894 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22
(1982)).
262. See La Shawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 996 (D.D.C. 1991).
263. Id. In a footnote, the court stated that it was persuaded to adopt the professional
judgment standard since the plaintiffs were seeking only injunctive relief. Id. at 996 n.29. The
suggestion was made that deliberate indifference may be a more appropriate standard in cases
seeking damages, where there is greater concern about "the chilling effect that an unfavorable
judgment may have on municipal policymakers." Id.
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DeShaney. The two major questions are clear: (1) In what contexts be-
yond imprisonment and involuntary commitment is an affirmative duty
of protection owed?; and (2) What level of culpability will the plaintiff be
required to demonstrate to establish a breach of the duty in a given
context?
This Article suggests that the concept of custody set out in
DeShaney should be interpreted expansively to include not only prisoners
and involuntarily committed mental patients, but also (1) "voluntarily"
committed mental patients; (2) foster children who are either voluntarily
or involuntarily placed in the state's child welfare system; and (3) school-
children who are in an environment controlled by the state and who rely
on state actors to provide for their basic needs, safety, and welfare while
they are in that environment.
Within the context of custody, as in the noncustodial setting, the
test for a breach of the duty could be, as Chief Judge Sloviter has sug-
gested, the shocks-the-conscience standard. Different levels of culpabil-
ity would satisfy the standard depending upon the nature of the custody.
Distinctions should not be based on the voluntary or involuntary aspect
of the custodial arrangement, but rather on (1) the responsibilities as-
sumed by the particular state actors involved; (2) the need for state actors
to have more or less unfettered discretion in a particular area; (3) the
degree of control actually exercised by the state in a given situation; and
(4) the extent of reliance and the degree of vulnerability attributed to the
person in the state's care.
Given these considerations, it would not be unreasonable to apply a
professional judgment standard to those state actors who are trained and
employed as professionals in state mental institutions, the state's child
welfare system, and the public schools. The test should be: (1) whether
the individual actor's behavior constituted a substantial departure from
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards; (2) whether such
departure was virtually certain to be detrimental to the safety, health, or
welfare of those persons within the professional's care; and (3) whether
the constitutional injury complained of was in fact caused by the failure
to adhere to accepted professional judgment. Conduct by professionals
that represents a significant departure from accepted professional prac-
tice and that causes constitutional injury to those entrusted in their care
should meet the shocks-the-conscience standard of the court.2"
264. The professional judgment standard, unlike the deliberate indifference standard, would
entail a purely objective test, analogous to the "objective reasonableness" standard employed
in Fourth Amendment excessive force cases. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386
(1989). Thus, it would not be relevant to the test whether the professional actually knew that
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For nonprofessional state employees in these settings, liability
should depend upon the plaintiff's ability to show that the constitutional
injury was caused by the defendants' deliberate indifference to the safety,
health, or well-being of those in their care. Deliberate indifference would
be established by showing that a defendant consciously acted or chose
not to act with knowledge of the obvious consequences of this con-
duct.265 Likewise, government entity liability for a failure to protect-
based on a failure to train, supervise, or discipline-would necessitate
proof of deliberate indifference as required by the Court in City of Canton
v. Harris.
266
In noncustodial contexts, there are two different points at which the
question of culpability plays a role. In assessing the threshold question of
whether an affirmative duty to protect from harm inflicted by third per-
sons should be recognized in noncustodial contexts, the test should be
whether a state actor deliberately chose a course of conduct or failed to
act, knowing that the act or omission was substantially certain to create
an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff or arbitrarily enhance the
danger to which the plaintiff would be exposed. If the factfinder answers
this question affirmatively, then the second question should be whether
the state actor who knowingly exposed the plaintiff to danger by the act
or omission was deliberately indifferent to the need to ameliorate or pro-
vide protection from the situation created. Government liability for con-
stitutional injuries caused by a failure to train would, as in the custodial
context, be based on City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard.
The search for criteria to define the circumstances that should give
rise to an affirmative duty to protect under the substantive Due Process
Clause has been misguided by the view that DeShaney recognizes such a
duty only in involuntary custodial situations, as well as the assumption
that a uniform standard of culpability will apply to all such claims. This
Article has demonstrated that restricting the affirmative duty to contexts
of imprisonment, involuntary institutionalization, and involuntary place-
ment in a state's foster care system is an arbitrary, unfair, and unneces-
her conduct violated accepted professional practice or whether she intended a substantial
deviation from accepted professional standards.
265. Being charged with knowledge of the obvious or very likely consequences of one's
conduct does not mean that the individual defendant must have intended or actually been
aware that such consequences would violate the victim's constitutional rights.
266. 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); see supra note 219 and accompanying text. For an extensive
discussion of City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard as applied to a school district's
decision to transfer, rather than remove, a teacher who had been accused of sexually molesting
a student, see Gonzalez v. Ysleta Independent School District, 996 F.2d 745, 755 (5th Cir.
1993).
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sary means of containing the expansion of substantive due process
claims. The complexity and variety of situations in which the affirmative
duty should be recognized dictate that careful attention be paid to the
level of culpability required in order to establish a breach of the duty,
and close scrutiny be given to the causal connection between the chal-
lenged behavior and the resulting harm.
If the constitutional backdrop for affirmative duty cases is a shocks-
the-conscience standard, the degree of fault or level of culpability that
will satisfy this test should vary depending on the nature of the custodial
arrangement in the custody cases. In noncustodial creation-of-danger or
enhancement-of-risk cases, liability of state actors should depend upon
their knowingly putting the individual in a position of unreasonable risk
of harm and then being deliberately indifferent to the protective needs of
that individual.
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